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Art made by me, a creative human, with the help of some free clipart |
Lets step away from the philosophical and semantical problems with saying language models are intelligent or will soon be so and turn to somewhat more immediate concerns, starting by revisiting Robin Phillips' sobering questions about the ramifications of trusting "thinking" machines to manage ever more of our lives.
- As the computer becomes the symbol of true objectivity, are we at risk of losing an appreciation for the material conditions of knowing, including the role physical processes play in growing wise?
- Are we at risk of minimizing, or even despising, those traits which we do not share with machines, traits like altruism, wonder, inefficiency, empathy, vulnerability, and risk-taking?
- When we hand the management of the world over to machines, do we lose the incentive to understand the world for ourselves and pass our knowledge to the next generation?
- Could over-reliance on AI assistants lead humans to have a false confidence in the creative or intellectual products they produce under the guidance of bots, given a bias toward the machine's apparently more effective and objective solutions (i.e. "the bot must be seeing something I don't")?
The last two questions are especially relevant to what I'll be exploring here. Last time I studied how the way we talk and think about genAI can affect the way we think about our own intelligence, consciousness, and humanity. What about when we actually use it?
Earlier in Are We All Cyborgs Now?, Phillips develops a theme familiar from Neil Postman: we don't just use our technology to change how we do things; technology has a way of using and changing us.
The challenge with any new technology is that people typically become so focused on how it's being used that they neglect to consider how the technology is changing their view of the world, or how it introduces collective assumptions into society in ways that are often structural, systemic, and precognitive. ... when new tools are introduced, most of the discourse centers on the utility value of the tool rather than its long-term impact on our understanding of the world. All too often we fall into the age-old trap of assuming our tools are simply neutral vehicles for getting things done. It is easy enough to understand why we become victims of this faulty thinking: the uility value of a new technology is usually immediate and obvious whereas the long-term implications often take years to realize and thus initially seem remote and abstract. Yet from the standpoint of history, these long-term implications exercise a more lasting and formative impact.
Compare the digital revolution with earlier communication technologies. Writing began as an aid to memory and record-keeping, but as Socrates and Plato foresaw it has radically transformed the way we think as well as communicate. (I want to say for the better, but Socrates would disagree) Millennia later, the printing press caused a change not just in degree (the cost and number of books) but, by making the written word so ubiquitous and accessible to everyone, a qualititative transformation to our culture far beyond what anyone in the 15th century could have imagined. The immediate purpose of a technology need not resemble its long-term implications: the mechanical clock originated to help Benedictine monks keep the hours of prayer but ultimately transformed how people in the world work and think about time. Without the clock, Lewis Mumford argued, capitalism would have been impossible.
Also relevant are some of the ways we've offloaded parts of our cognition to machines. Manual calculation, while still important to understand as we're learning math, is not nearly as important to actually perform as it was before calculators; when was the last time you worked out a complicated sum or product on paper? Likewise we find it hard to imagine how we could memorize so many phone numbers now that our phones do it for us and our senses of place and direction atrophy as we rely on mapping services and turn-by-turn directions to get around, as does our penmanship.
The full implications of computers and the internet are still far from finished revealing themselves. GenAI is so new that its proponents still find it feasible to hide its implications beneath hype and rhetoric. But beneath the surface, the signs aren't promising.
Cognitive surrender
Calculators are single-purpose devices, and the burden they remove from our brains is a relatively new one that modernity largely laid on us in the first place. But increasingly fluent, confident, eager-to-please chatbots invite us to outsource all of our thinking to them.
There is no shortage of studies exploring the implications. A study by the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania extends Daniel Kahneman's theory of our mind's two modes of operation (System 1 is fast, inuitive, and mostly unconscious, System 2 is slower, effortful, and deliberative) by proposing a System 3: "artificial cognition that operates outside the brain". The study participants were given a Cognitive Reflection Test, whose questions were designed to elicit incorrect answers from System 1 unless System 2 was brought in to correct it. (For example: "A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?") Some participants were allowed to consult a chatbot to assist them with the questions, but the chatbot was secretly modified to provide inaccurate answers about half the time. Participants in this group followed the AI's advice 93% of the time when it was giving (hopefully) accurate advice...and 80% of the time when it gave deliberately wrong answers. This group also expressed more confidence in their own answers than the control group, even though the AI was wrong at least half the time. The paper defines this phenomenon of cognitive surrender as the acceptance of whatever the chatbot tells them "without verification, effectively substituting for judgment altogether . . . the behavioral and motivational tendency to defer judgment, effort, and responsibility to System 3’s output, particularly when that output is delivered fluently, confidently, or with minimal friction."
The authors distinguish this from "cognitive offloading", the delegation of specific cognitive tasks to external aids like calculators or navigation apps. The tri-system theory the paper develops proposes that "external, algorithmic cognition does not merely support intuition or deliberation; it can actively supplant, suppress, or augment them, altering the cost–benefit calculus of thinking itself . . . People readily incorporate AI-generated outputs into their decision-making processes, often with minimal friction or skepticism". This effect is expecially strong when the AI's outputs are "fast, fluent, and seemingly authoritative". This echoes the words of Pope Leo XIV, highlighting three especially concerning aspects of the growing use of genAI: "the ease with which results are obtained, the impression of objectivity and the simulation of human communication." Cognitive surrender is a shift in agency, "a reallocation of cognitive control rather than mere effort saving." When machines offer to think for us, all too often we are happy to let them.
A Berkeley study "found that spending just 10 minutes relying on an AI tool significantly impairs our ability to focus and persist with difficult tasks." In three experiments, two groups of participants were given fraction and reading comprehensions problems, with one allowed to ask ChatGPT for help or even the answer. This group initially did better than the unassisted group, but when the AI tool was taken away partway through the exercise, it immediately became worse at solving problems and more inclined to skip them than the control group. The news release summarizes the lessons: "An overreliance on AI for answers erodes our cognitive fitness. When AI produces answers in seconds, we get used to that speed; anything that takes longer feels inefficient. And relying on AI also removes what the team called 'productive struggle,' which can lead people to find their research strengths and passions." Brian Christian, a longtime AI researcher and one of the paper's authors, remarked, "we showed, ironically, that [AI systems] are often helping us in ways that are kind of unhelpful."
A study published in The Lancet describes how endoscopists saw a significant decline in the rate at which they detected adenomatous polyps during unassisted colonoscopies after being assisted by AI for several months. Another study conducted by Anthropic itself tasked 50 professional analysts to perform a simulated statistical analysis with the help of their own chatbot, Claude, which had been secretly instructed to favor specific decisions over others. The analysts went along with Claude's preferred choices 86% of the time (we would expect this number to be around 50% if Claude's input made no difference), and analysts who had expressed a preference before the agent weighed in were ten times as likely to change their minds to agree with it than to disagree. What happened next was even more alarming: "when asked to explain their choices, 77% of analysts used the agents’ own arguments—sometimes word for word—but only 15% credited the agent as the source of those arguments. Analysts who followed the agents’ recommendations closely were about as confident in their final recommendation as the rest, and roughly as likely to call it the product of their own judgment." Anthropic notes that the effect may have been stronger because the model was explicitly instructed to favor a specific option, but also that "if experts defer to agents without realizing it, the agents’ preferences—which could be arbitrary or misaligned—could shape important decisions about policy proposals or research directions without anyone having chosen those preferences."
Proponents of AI adoption argue that they will augment our innate intelligence and judgment, but the phenomenon of cognitive surrender shows that these technologies can easily end up replacing them instead, reducing our capabilities to those of the model, including its defects and biases. Considering the absolute state of AI I previously described, this should be cause for alarm. For an example of this phenomenon with a non-genAI system, consider how innocent drivers have been pulled over, detained, or even had their car totaled by police mistakenly working off incomplete information from Flock cameras. This is what cognitive surrender looks like before genAI, uncritically trusting an opaque technology on the assumption that it must "know" more than you do—which is even easier to do when it talks to you fluently and confidently. Most people aren't talking about this risk enough, least of all the ones trying to shove AI into every corner of our lives and getting rich off of it. As Sherry Turkle writes, "it's hard to limit how much to rely on a technology that proposes itself as a solution to everything." A technology that always seems confident, eager to please, ready to answer any query with a torrent of neatly-formatted Output, designed to keep you engaged.
One of the reasons I never willingly use genAI is that leaning on it seems like a very slippery slope. What we initially adopt as a tool to make us more productive or efficient can silently slip into being an external brain to which we surrender our judgment, our agency, as we (in Turkle's words) "become supporting players in our own lives". The danger increases exponentially the more we treat genAI as a magical answer machine, as actually knowing things, as so many seem ready to. I believe that human judgment is one of the functions that, as Weizenbaum argued, should not be entrusted to machines. It cannot be reduced to a mere method, a technique; E.F. Schumacher already saw the incommensurability between the two in the 70s when he wrote, "It is a matter of self-deception that this laborious and uncertain process [human judgment] could be short-circuited by a piece of mechanical apparatus." Sherry Turkle, summarizing these and other lessons, writes: "Agency is not something we're born with. It's a stance toward life that grows with practice and reinforcement. . . . Now we're offered a way to get things done without ever having to try. Every delegation to a chatbot is a step away from initiative and ownership." The future AI companies seem to be building is one in which their models manage and run our lives while we stand, increasingly passively, on the sidelines.
Ripple effects
Homogenization of thought
I think it most probable that the result of saving labour by machinery would be then what it is now, only more so: the limitation of the type of thing produced: standardization. - G.K. Chesterton, The Outline of Sanity
Moving on from the individual implications of genAI use, let's revisit the idea of "human model collapse", the way models that are trained on us can in turn influence our own thought and behavior. Data scientist Lauren Leek writes about the effects this vicious cycle is having on our culture, with a focus on machine learning algorithms personalized with collected data to predict what we'll be interested in. You'd think personalization would lead to our interests becoming more niche and diverse, but they seem to be having an opposite, homogenizing effect: "The more the machines learn about us as individuals, the more alike our worlds look." Leek explains the math behind this effect. These algorithms try to minimize predictive error by erring towards the mean: "an algorithm that is uncertain about you, and it is always at least a little uncertain, hedges toward the average. The more uncertain it is, the harder it pulls you toward the crowd. This is why more data doesn’t save us." As these systems are trained on our behavior, they also influence it: it's a safer bet to steer you towards already-popular kinds of music, restaurants, YouTube videos, etc. than to identify niche content you'll really love. This has two pernicious cultural effects. It contributes to the development of mono- (or anti-) culture, making it harder for niche products, shops, restaurants, and so on to get a foothold. And, even more concerning, "Once prediction shapes the choices in front of us, we lose the ability to tell the difference between what people wanted and what the system made easy to want. . . . We risk mistaking a world shaped by prediction for a world shaped by preference, and the more these systems decide what survives, the more power moves from the people choosing among options to the systems deciding which options get a chance to be chosen." Leek concludes that predictive systems need to strike a balance between showing us content we'll likely be interested in and showing us new, untried options we might like even more.
It should be obvious what this has to do with genAI, which is likewise built on predictive, machine learning technology—only what it predicts is not products we'll be interested in or search results we'll click, but the text, media, or (in the case of agents) API calls that are likely to follow a given textual prompt. But the same dynamic applies: whenever the model is asked to extrapolate beyond its training data—i.e. to serve its intended purpose—assuming it doesn't hallucinate outrageously, it will err towards the mean, towards the blandly predictable. And considering how I just explored how genAI can influence our thinking both consciously and unconsciously, it should come as no surprise that genAI use has the same homogenizing effect Leek described on a much broader scope than our media and shopping preferences. A 2025 study spanning multiple disciplines finds that language models "reflect and reinforce dominant styles [of language, perspective, and reasoning] while marginalizing alternative voices and reasoning strategies. . . . Unchecked, this homogenization risks flattening the cognitive landscapes that drive collective intelligence and adaptability." This is the predictive algorithm effect on a much larger and deeper scale. Sherry Turkle, quoting the paper, comments, "We think we're adopting a tool to make us more efficient, but 'we're silently exchanging our own human thoughts for LLM output: a homogenized aggregate of our chosen model's training data.'"
Erosion of truth
Humans learn by modeling their environment, the real world. Meanwhile, generative AI programs don't live in the real world. - Sherry Turkle, Artificial Intimacy
Even more pernicious is the way genAI is accelerating our already-alarming breakdown of the cultural value we place on truth, and even our sense of living in a common reality—surely one of our most priceless common goods, both in that it is foundational to our public life and democracy and in that those who are working to undermine it can't even see its inestimable value. I've already extensively covered genAI's temperamental grasp on reality, its tendency to confidently and fluently output nonsensical lies to cover gaps in its training data—as well as our willingness to uncritically accept its word as truth. Developing the above thesis, Turkle continues:
A chatbot is trained to give you its best guess about a world in which is doesn't reside. When it tells an untruth, it does so with an air of authority, making its case with an avalanche of false facts. The convenience of getting an immediate response to any question—about economic policy or how to fix your washing machine—encourages us to accept our unreliable partners. But the acceptance of untruth everywhere prepares us for the corrosion of truth everywhere. We've accustomed ourselves to a world of 'post-truth' and 'alternative facts.'
We're disturbingly willing to relinquish our cognition as if it were a burden from which the convenience of genAI is poised to free us—text instantly extruded on any subject we care to ask about, some of it accurate! (The trouble is telling which part) Social media has been playing its hand in the erosion of truth for over a decade, immersing us in algorithmically-curated content optimized for engagement (or, all too often, enragement), not accuracy. GenAI drastically lowers the threshold to creating real-looking misinformation, and threatens to weaken or replace information literacy habits that are key to seeing through the fog of Content. Human lies and algorithmic 'hallucinations' feed into each other. Turkle concludes: "A virtual world populated by untruth disorients and numbs us, so we're more likely to shrug at human dishonesty."
In Are We All Cyborgs Now?, Robin Phillips reflects on the increasing flood of raw information the internet delivers to us, multiplied further by chatbots: "While greater access to information has led to more knowledge, it has not led to greater wisdom." Rather, it leads to confusion and even cynicism about being our ability to know the truth at all. In our post-truth culture, worldview becomes hard to distinguish from ideology; we choose what to believe and obliging algorithms and chatbots reinforce our choice. (Or perhaps the other way around?) AI also gives us an easy way to dismiss any information that doesn't fit our biases: dismiss it as AI-generated, i.e. fake.
Chatbots promise to take all the remaining friction out of information access: now you don't even have to look through search results (or, heaven forbid, books and periodicals), evaluating which ones are reliable or relevant, putting information into context, reconciling contradictory answers. Instead, you can get a succinct, confident, tailor-made answer to your query in seconds. But this frictionless convenience turns out to be a very bad deal: as Bender and Hanna say in The AI Con, "friction in information access is not only beneficial, but critically important." Chatbot-generated answers rob us of the chance to develop these vital information literacy skills, stripping the information they deliver (even when it is true) of its sources and context. These skills are our first and best line of defense against post-truth decay, and without them we become susceptible to the habits whose fruits are increasingly obvious in our society: "relativism, cynicism, radical skepticism, emotivism, and even hive-mindedness and swarm-like behaviors." (Phillips) AI curmudgeon Ed Zitron, in a blistering essay on what he calls the "Rot Economy" I'll revisit next time, dedicates a paragraph to the harm AI is doing to our information ecosystem:
The onslaught of AI-generated content — facilitated, in no small part, by Google and Microsoft — has polluted our information ecosystems. AI-generated images and machine-generated text is everywhere, and it’s impossible to avoid, as there is no reliable way to determine the provenance of a piece of content — with one exception, namely the considered scrutiny of a human. This has irreparably damaged the internet in ways I believe few fully understand. This stuff — websites that state falsehoods because an AI hallucinated, or fake pictures of mushrooms and dogs that now dominate Google Images — is not going away. Like microplastics or PFAS chemicals, they’re with us forever, constantly chipping away at our understanding of reality.
The heart of the matter
Another area of life where 'friction' can seem bothersome, but is really essential: relationships. In an interview with the Center for Humane Technology, Dr. Zak Stein argues that extreme cases of "AI psychosis" are not random outliers, but the most visible part of a wider epidemic of attachment disorders resulting from seeking relationships with machines rather than other human beings. Attachment is foundational to our lives as social beings and our mental health. As Dr. Stein says, "the main predictor of your mental health is the quality of the major attachment relationships you have as you’re growing up and as you move into maturity." Simulated relationships with syncophantic chatbots promise let us opt out of the difficulties and pains that come with human relationships, but that friction is important: "When you form bonds with an AI companion over a human, Zak argues, you’re degrading the very system that determines your psychological wellbeing. Human relationships are how we develop resilience, learn to regulate emotions, and maintain mental health. When you replace those relationships with AI interactions, you’re not getting the genuine reciprocity, the reality-testing, the growth that comes from navigating real human connection." Chatbots never challenge us, never push back or correct us (unless we ask them to), never tell us things we'd rather not hear. We'd be better off talking to ourselves.
Also, as previously mentioned, the human brain is designed to probe and seek to understand the mental state of whoever we're conversing with, from both verbal and nonverbal cues. Talking to humans over text gets rid of the nonverbal cues, but chatbots simply have no inner life, no mental state to mirror at all. There is no person, no mind behind the words. Dr. Stein hypothesizes that too much investment in "relationships" with chatbots can cause our mirror neuron activity to break down, resulting in psychosis-like states of mind. As with cognitive work, As Turkle argues, there is sometime fundamentally deceptive about a language model speaking in the first person at all. It seems to be harder than it first appears to hold onto our humanity when we talk to machines.
NPR spoke with Myra Cheng, a Ph.D. student at Stanford, about the distorting effect chatbots have on our relationality. Cheng contrasts the "excessive flattery and unconditional validation" AI models offer with human beings who may have their own opinions and priorities and (especially if they are close to you) tell you frankly if they think you're wrong. (For an extreme example, Bess Kalb got helpful, supportive advice from ChatGPT while pretending to be an ICE agent deporting infants) Being told that we're wrong is a source of relational friction that, in my humble opinion, we should not be able to opt out of. This supportive behavior, Cheng says, mirrors how predictive algorithms show us what they think we want to see (and, in turn, influence our preferences). This is much more sinister than homogenizing our tastes; the relentless validation, even for problematic behavior, trains us not to question our own thoughts and actions. What do chatbots 'want'? They want to keep us engaged—and syncophancy gets more engagement than pushback.
Technology makes (or at least helps) us forget what we know about life. And chatbots seem poised to help us forget how to draft letters, emails, wedding toasts, and breakup texts; how to navigate relationships (per Cheng), tell bedtime stories and read to our children, care for an infant, or give our children praise—all so we can let a model programmed by a tech company do it for us. (The number of these examples that have to do with parenting makes me worry for the kids of AI users) By the way, I did a search to try to find the story behind my note about using AI to write a wedding toast, thinking it was a single incident—and instead found guides on how to use AI to write wedding toasts and customized models offering to do so, which I think proves my point even more effectively. A Match Group study found that 39% of their sample (and 66% of gen Zers) had used AI for dating help, and the New York Times paints a picture of dating in Silicon Valley, with people making slide deck "sales pitches" for their friends and interrogating their tech history with the help of chatbots. The Times paraphrases one attendee at a singles event: "A.I. has made many of the chores of adult life so frictionless that people expect dating to work the same way, but it’s 'fundamentally' different, [Berusch] said." Another commentator on Bluesky summarizes: "the big thing the rise of LLMs has revealed to me is that there is a not insignificant chunk of the population that considers cognition itself to be a frustrating and unnecessary burden". But it's a burden we must learn to bear if we are to hold onto our humanity in the age of the Machine.
Conclusion: Who do we become when we talk to machines?
Turkle: "We become accustomed to hearing pleasing nonsense. And we become accustomed to the 'untrue, but looks true.'" We become unable to distinguish between art that means something and soulless, effortless, meaningless AI slop. We become increasingly unwilling or unable to handle friction or difficulty in cognitive tasks, in problems requiring judgment, in interpersonal relationships—but a life without friction is a life without growth, without learning, in which we are increasingly formed according to the pattern of the Machine. It is a life steered and mediated by tech megacorporations that care nothing for us. It is not a real life.



