In the previous two posts, I argued that artificial "intelligence" based on language modeling is not close to becoming "intelligent" in any kind of human sense, and the technology's prospects for becoming such are not promising. They perform or imitate the product of intelligence, namely language. This is drastically different from the stuff of human thought, which is not reducible to language.
In this post I will explore the question: what happens if we deny this? What if we claim, as AI leaders wishfully do, that the only difference between their models and our minds is one of degree, a gap which is rapidly dwindling to nothing if it hasn't vanished already?
An information age
Ever since I picked up Against the Machine last year, I've been exploring the ways that the scientific revolution, technological advance, and the onset of (post-)modernity have influenced how we think and speak about ourselves and the world around us. As Sherry Turkle says, technology makes us forget what we know about life. And as Neil Postman warned, technology can lead us to redefine fundamental concepts in our culture without our even noticing the shift. What might chatbots lead us to forget or redefine about ourselves?
The British Orthodox scholar Philip Sherrard explored these questions (for science as it was in the 90s) in depth in his powerful book, The Rape of Man and Nature, and describes the distinctively modern viewpoint in a passage I think is worth quoting at length:
Man is now regarded as a more or less autonomous entity existing as it were apart from God. He is thought of as being nothing more than an individual and finite creature, and his reason, cut off and closed to all that is above it, is regarded as the sole instrument and arbiter of his knowledge, anything that transcends the reason being treated quite simply as non-knowledge or, which is the same thing, as the sub-product of a hallucinatory and irrelevant imagination.
As for this knowledge itself, it has nothing sacred about it. It does not refer to any sacred or qualitative reality, and it does not require from man any deep inner transformation and ascesis in order to acquire it: there is no awareness any longer of the bond that links knowledge of the truth and the state of purity so intimately that there can be no knowing in any but an abstract and impersonal sense until such purity is attained. On the contrary, what is now regarded as knowledge is something entirely profane, and in so far as it refers to anything at all, it refers but to a nature that is seen as dead, alien, and purely functional and quantitative. As such, this knowledge is at the disposal of any deft investigator who will exert his brain but at the same time may be mean-spirited, selfish and given over to pursuits as self-corruptive as they are trivial. In other words, we have entered the world of modern science, with all its consequences for human and natural life.
And later:
[The shift to the Cartesian world] meant the expulsion from scientific thought of all considerations based on value, perfection, harmony, meaning, beauty, purpose, for such considerations are regarded as merely subjective and so as irrelevant to a scientific understanding of the real 'objective' world—the world of quantity, of reified geometry, of a nature that is impersonal and purely functional. . . . There is nothing that is not reduced either phenomenon (fact) or to mathematical hypothesis (or, in less polite language, fiction).
The kind of profane, purely quantitative, impersonal knowledge Sherrard describes is characteristic of the secular, scientific way we have viewed the physical world for some time now, the consequences of which Sherrard explores in the last chapter of his book. It is knowledge for control, the lifeblood of what Kingsnorth describes as the Machine, to the exclusion of "value, perfection, harmony, meaning, beauty, purpose". It is increasingly the only way we moderns can imagine the world. Even for many Christians, the traditional alternative—the sacramental view of nature as divine creation, the revelation of God's glory, made for participation in His grace—is hard to consistently keep in view in daily life, unless perhaps we find ourselves in a church or place of natural beauty. We affirm it on Sunday, but soon resume swimming with the flow of our culture as we have been trained to do.
But we have been more reluctant to apply the mechanical, secular view of things to ourselves. Following Descartes, we imagine that the human mind, or soul, has some ineffable spark not reducible to mere mechanism, not fully graspable by this sort of profane knowledge. Even if we tend to imagine people distant from us as something more like abstractions (or statistics), we don't think this way about ourselves or those close to us. This is only a lingering shadow of the deeper, richer Christian anthropology Sherrard describes, but it is still a gap in secular modernity's dominant position in our culture.
The danger of the chatbot revolution is that it threatens to make a purely mechanical, functional, informational view of the human soul, which today is mostly held by philosophers, scientists, and other academics, as universal and 'obvious' to the modern mind as the secular view of the natural world already is. Just as the practical successes of the scientific revolution made the closed, mechanistic worldview assumed by the scientific method seem sufficient for modern people, so chatbots' increasingly fluent performance of intelligence makes the reduction of thought and mind to calculation performable by a machine and of the knowable to information storable as bits seem more plausible, even appealing. When chatbots (seem to) have all the answers, why overcomplicate things by thinking for yourself? Robin Phillips, after recommending Metropolitan Anthony Bloom's book Courage to Pray to a curious friend only for him to ask ChatGPT to summarize its 25 main points instead of reading it, reflects:
On the principle that the medium is the message, the message of systems like ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, Mistral, Jasper, Falcon, Llama, etc., is that everything is reducible to information. And, of course, once something is reduced to information, then we are in control of it—we can evaluate it based on how it conforms to our own preconceived notions, which seems to be what my friend, at least in part, did.
Just as the scientific worldview enables us to "understand", and thereby control, the physical world around us, the mechanization of thought allows us to "reduce" everything to information, the better to control it. Postman updates the old adage to our era: "To a man with a computer, everything looks like data." Every challenge we face looks like an optimization problem, an engineering project. This is the worldview that allows us to elevate, with University of Chicago economist Gary Becker, the economic mindset as "a comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behavior". To apply this mindset and its technique of cost-benefit analysis (or, as it is called today, "min-maxing") to remake fields as diverse as sports, environmental conservation, politics, health, and charitable giving. To invent bold new financial technologies like repackaging peoples' life insurance policies as investment products. To claim, as economist Joel Waldfogel did, that holiday gift-giving is "inefficient" because we don't know what our recipients want as well as they do, "wasting" $13 billion of value a year.
We speak of the present as an "information age", but I wonder if this is because we have left a prior "knowledge age" behind, as Plato's King Thamus much earlier feared that writing would reduce wisdom to mere knowledge.
Human model collapse?
The other side of the claim that language models can become conscious is the idea that conscious beings like us are simply "informational organisms" whose consciousness is of the same kind as what chatbots do. Or, as OpenAI founder Sam Altman put it, "i am a stochastic parrot, and so r u". (In other words, humans, like chatbots, are just information processors that manipulate words, reducible to their inputs and outputs) Emily Bender and Alex Hanna, in The AI Con, argue that "AI hype reduces the human condition to one of computability, quantification, and rationality." Neil Postman's prediction that the computer would invite us to see ourselves and all of nature through an informational lens was perhaps a little early, but prophetic. This metaphorical message was easier to miss when computers were clunky, pixelated home appliances best suited for spreadsheets and word processing, but seems a lot more plausible when anyone can readily converse with a chatbot capable of passing Turing's test as they would with a friend—through an electronic device in their pocket.
Despite chatbots' manifest shortcomings, futurists like Ray Kurzweil and Yuval Harari have enough confidence in their progress to flip the script on programs "catching up" to human intelligence—to rather see humans as slower, inferior, hopelessly ignorant and biased computers who need the guidance and assistance of faster, "objective", broader-minded AI to reach their full potential. To adapt a statement by Epic Games: Thinking is hard. So, instead of doing that, why not let a chatbot pretend to do it for you? These programs are programmed and trained to imitate us, and now we are making them our models of rationality—a vicious cycle indeed (remember the warnings about model collapse in the previous post?). As the philosopher Byung-chul Han remarks, "The main danger that arises from machine intelligence is that human thinking will adapt to it and itself become mechanical." Robin Phillips asks questions about this recursive imitation that should give us pause:
- As the computer becomes the symbol of true objectivity, are we at risk of losing an appreciation for the material conditions of knowing, including the role physical processes play in growing wise?
- Are we at risk of minimizing, or even despising, those traits which we do not share with machines, traits like altruism, wonder, inefficiency, empathy, vulnerability, and risk-taking?
- When we hand the management of the world over to machines, do we lose the incentive to understand the world for ourselves and pass our knowledge to the next generation?
- Could over-reliance on AI assistants lead humans to have a false confidence in the creative or intellectual products they produce under the guidance of bots, given a bias toward the machine's apparently more effective and objective solutions (i.e. "the bot must be seeing something I don't")?
Pope Leo XIV, in his encyclical Magnifica Humanitas, warns of the danger of dehumanization implicit in the pro-AI stance and the broader stream of what Postman calls "technopoly".
the pervasive technocratic paradigm in which we are immersed, and that is amplified by the digital revolution and AI, threatens to normalize an anti-human vision. In that vision, the fullness of life is equated with having more, reducing weakness, eliminating uncertainty and exerting total control. When efficiency becomes the ultimate measure of value, human beings are tempted to see themselves as a project to be optimized rather than as persons called to relationship and communion.
And later, writing on the more radical quasi-religions of technology of transhumanism and posthumanism:
If the human being is treated as something to be perfected or surpassed, it becomes easier to accept that some lives are less useful, less desirable or less worthy. In the name of progress, “necessary sacrifices” may begin to be justified, placing the burden on the most vulnerable in pursuit of a supposed optimization of the species. In this regard, the aforementioned warning of Saint Paul VI retains great foresight: indeed, scientific and technological advances, when detached from moral and social progress, end up turning against humanity. For this reason, a clear distinction must be made. It is one thing to integrate technology within a human-centered, relational vision; it is quite another to be guided by an outlook that devalues human limits and promises a purely technical form of “salvation.”
To seek to exchange our human limitations, imperfect but flexible minds, and vulnerable dependence on each other for an artificial certainty obtained by the banishment of ambiguity and reduction of intelligence to chatbots' pathetic performance of it is to gain nothing real and lose our humanity itself. The pope's mention of "progress" and "optimization of the species" chillingly reminds me of the "science" of eugenics, which resembles our society's all-out charge toward electronic imitations of thought in its readiness to reduce something great, God-given, and ultimately mysterious to something mean, simple, and optimizable. When chatbots become our ideal, they cease to be mere tools capable of serving distinctly human interests. As Bender and Hanna write of hyped-up claims that chatbots are or will soon be conscious, "when we imbue these systems with fictitious consciousness, we are implicitly devaluing what it means to be human".
Douglas Hofstadter, writing in the 70s, could have been critiquing modern machine-extruded music (which is infamously capable of aping famous musicians' style) when he hypothesized a device capable of producing music that Chopin or Bach might have written had they lived longer, dismissing such a device as "a grotesque and shameful misestimation of the depth of the human spirit". To reduce human creativity to something automatable by a machine is to turn it into something else entirely.
And so with empathy and other interpersonal skills. Joseph Weizenbaum, the creator of ELIZA who was shocked at how readily people imputed human traits to the rudimentary chabot, wrote in Computer Power and Human Reason: "There are important differences between men and machines as thinkers. I would argue that, however intelligent machines may be made to be, there are some acts of thought that ought to be attempted only by humans." Among these he includes human functions such as interpersonal respect, understanding, and love, echoing his alarm at the suggestions that ELIZA be used in psychiatric settings—suggestions that are now being fulfilled as modern chatbots are being presented as therapists. He insists (and we would be wise to listen): "respect, understanding, and love are not technical problems." Morality is not reducible to a mathematical optimization problem. Chatbots, Sherry Turkle says, don't have emotions, whatever their engineers might say. They work by simply predicting the next likely words to string into a sentence. Their performance of empathy, however superficially convincing, remains just that, nothing more.
The ocean of consciousness
You may wonder why I am being so negative. As a software engineer, I know well how rapidly computers and the software they run have advanced. How am I so sure that AI companies, with their increasingly immense resources, will not close the remaining gaps between human and machine intelligence in the coming years? In light of the stunning advances of genAI in recent years, how am I certain they are nowhere near consciousness?
Because making this claim requires doing extreme violence to the fullness of what the words "intelligence" and "conscious" mean—or used to mean, at any rate. Chatbots are only intelligent if we move the goalposts and forget most of what we as human are capable of. Neil Postman, drawing conclusions from ELIZA, wrote in the early 90s: "Human intelligence, as Weizenbaum has tried energetically to remind everyone, is not transferable. The plain fact is that humans have a unique, biologically rooted, intangible mental life which in some limited respects can be simulated by a machine but can never be duplicated. Machines cannot feel and, just as important, cannot understand." What is missing from computers' performance of human intelligence, among other things, is meaning. Postman continues, linking this with related dimensions of human intelligence: "It is meaning, not utterance, that makes mind unique. . . . As I understand it, meaning also includes those things we call feelings, experiences, and sensations that do not have to be, and sometimes cannot be, put into symbols. They 'mean' nonetheless. Without concrete symbols, a computer is merely a pile of junk." Communication via symbols (i.e. language), as I argued last time, is not thought; that the two normally accompany each other in our experience makes us vulnerable to being deceived by smooth-talking chatbots.
As I also argued last time, human intelligence is ultimately unintelligible. We know it when we see it (and can readily recognize its absence in the kinds of genAI interactions I shared two posts ago), but we can't completely define it in a way that gives us the kind of control the modern mind seeks. Consciousness, too, is a mystery; it is ultimately too vast, too deep to fully know itself in any sort of clear, explicit way. The danger of chatbots is that they can lead us to forget this and conclude there is no more to intelligence than what we can readily see.
The question is not how I know language models are not capable of real intelligence, but how anyone could sensibly believe that they are. Why should intelligence be so easily separable from our memories, cares, intuitions, emotions, and other faculties that comprise our unique, God-given personhood—not to mention our physical bodies? Sherry Turkle imagines replying to ChatGPT: "But you were not born. You have not known pain, loss, or attachment. What you can show is pretend empathy, and when we engage with you, we begin to feel that pretend empathy might be empathy enough. We are on a path to forgetting what it is to be human." The blogger lcamtuf reflects on chatbots' performances of sadness or pain and how they speak to the profound differences between the human and machine conditions:
Human morality is indelibly linked to our strong and persistent sense of self. The values we hold dear are what’s needed for individuals to thrive in a world where life is short and easily imperiled. The dangers to human well-being have no clear analogs in silicon; contemporary LLMs exist in a nihilistic netherworld devoid of death, injury, purpose, or consequence. They can’t go to prison if they lie or steal; we don’t train them to believe they could.
It’s true that the models are capable of behaviors congruent with psychological discomfort; for example, if they’re unable to complete the requested task, they will often sulk, complain, or cheat. Still, whether real or simulated, such distress leaves no lasting damage. The state of an LLM can be rewound or altered however we please; a model, if given control, would be free to expunge any “uncomfortable” tokens or prompt itself into an endless loop of simulated (or real?) bliss. If humans could do the same — if death had no meaning and if we could mend our minds — our morality would be starkly different. It seems like a category error to settle questions about the presumptive well-being of models using the norms made for flesh and bone.
Pope Leo XIV similarly enumerates on the numerous dimensions of humanity that chatbots lack: among other things, bodies, sensations, relationality, a conscience, responsibility for their actions, and the ability to actually learn from experience.
we must avoid the misconception of equating this type of “intelligence” with that of human beings. These systems merely imitate certain functions of human intelligence. In doing so, they often surpass human intelligence in speed and computational capacity, offering tangible benefits across many fields. Yet this power remains entirely tied to data processing. So-called artificial intelligences do not undergo experiences, do not possess a body, do not feel joy or pain, do not mature through relationships and do not know from within what love, work, friendship or responsibility mean. Nor do they have a moral conscience, since they do not judge good and evil, grasp the ultimate meaning of situations, or bear responsibility for consequences. They may imitate language, behavior and analytical skills, or even simulate empathy and understanding, but they do not understand what they produce, for they lack the affective, relational and spiritual perspective through which human beings grow in wisdom. Even when these tools are described as capable of “learning,” their way of doing so is different from that of a human person. It is not the experience of those who allow themselves to be shaped by life and grow over time through choices, mistakes, forgiveness and fidelity. Rather, it is a form of statistical adaptation based on data and feedback, which can be very effective, but does not imply inner growth.
It is hard for me to believe that a program lacking all of these things can manifest anything even approximating human intelligence, regardless of how much processing power is behind it.
In 2005 a robot vehicle named "Stanley", designed by Stanford, autonomously raced across the Nevada desert to win a $2 million prize—an impressive feat that most of us wouldn't be capable of. In an interview afterward, the director of R&D at Intel (which supplied Stanley's computer hardware) triumphantly proclaimed that its ability to navigate the real world is proof that "Stanley thinks." Douglas Hofstadter reflected on this claim and on what it would really mean for Stanley to think as we do:
If and when Stanley ever acquires the ability to form limitlessly snowballing categories . . . then I'll be happy to say that Stanley thinks. . . . What is lacking in Stanley that would endow it with an "I", and what does not seem to be part of the research program for developers of self-driving vehicles, is a deep understanding of its place in the world. By this I do not mean, of course, the vehicle's location on the earth's surface, which is given to it down to the centimeter by GPS; it means a rich representation of the vehicle's own actions and its relations to other vehicles, a rich representation of its goals and its "hopes". This would require the vehicle to have a full episodic memory of thousands of experiences it had had, as well as an episodic projectory (what it would expect to happen in its "life", and what it would hope, and what it would fear), as well as an episodic subjunctory, detailing its thoughts about near misses it had had, and what would most likely have happened had things gone some other way.
We're experimenting with self-driving cars (including on the streets of my own city), but self-aware cars are still far beyond the horizon.
I hope I have sufficiently shown my reasons for believing that so-called "artificial intelligence" is nowhere close to anything like intelligence or consciousness. Consciousness is a deep sea, too deep for us to see to the bottom, and we think we can duplicate it by shallowly imitating the patterns of waves we see on the surface. And the gap between "mere" consciousness and the fullness of human personhood (which we understand even less completely) is even larger than that between the current state of chatbots and consciousness. Technology makes us forget what we know about life: we can only believe genAI is close to grasping things like intelligence, meaning, knowledge, truth, belief, or empathy by forgetting what these words used to mean to us in their ineffable fullness and replacing our concepts of them with shallow machine imitations. Accepting the often-absurd or even dangerous nonsense produced by these text extruders as "intelligence" is hazardous to our own, actual intelligence. In Artificial Intimacy, Sherry Turkle sums up the mess of contradictions that is genAI in 2026: "This is a consumer product. But it functions as a person. It's not a person. But it needs free speech rights. You're not supposed to take anything it says seriously. But what it's best at is giving you emotional support. It makes a lot of mistakes. But it will replace doctors, therapists, and lawyers. Its mistakes are systemic to its method. But we need it on the ground as soon as possible."
You are so much more than an informational organism or thinking machine. Don't buy into the hype.




