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Showing posts with label Incarnation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Incarnation. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 7, 2015

The Incarnational Unity of the Church

I, therefore, the prisoner of the Lord, beseech you to walk worthy of the calling with which you were called, with all lowliness and gentleness, with longsuffering, bearing with one another in love, endeavoring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. [There is] one body and one Spirit, just as you were called in one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism; one God and Father of all, who [is] above all, and through all, and in you all. (Eph 4:1-6 NKJV)

And He put all [things] under His feet, and gave Him [to be] head over all [things] to the church, which is His body, the fullness of Him who fills all in all. (Eph 1:22-23 NKJV)

This post is something of a sequel to the one in my Journey to Orthodoxy series on ecclesiology, the nature of the Church. In it, I compared and contrasted the prevailing Protestant and Orthodox views on the Church. I gave some reasons for my finding the Orthodox telling more convincing, but also laid out two of my lingering doubts about it. This time around, I hope to go somewhat deeper, spending some time on the history of the Protestant visible/invisible Church distinction itself, and to offer some better conclusions from what I have learned of Orthodoxy in the past year.

Tracing the dichotomy back to Augustine

First, the history of the distinction made by Protestants between the invisible Church (the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic body of Christ, the company of the predestined or the justified known only to God) and the visible Church (the local gatherings or manifestations of the true Church, always intermingled with hypocrites and the reprobate in this life). I will refer to this distinction as the "invisible-church theory", keeping in mind that those who hold to it do not deny that there can be and are authentic visible manifestations of it. The Reformation teachers of this distinction traced it back to proto-reformers like Hus and Wycliffe, and before them to Augustine and his interpretation of Scripture. Millard Erickson summarizes:
This distinction [the relationship between the visible church and the invisible church], which first appeared as early as Augustine, was first enunciated clearly by Martin Luther and then incorporated by John Calvin into his theology as well. It was Luther's way of dealing with the apparent discrepancies between the qualities of the church as we find them laid out in Scripture and the characteristics of the empirical church, as it actually exists on earth. He suggested that the true church consists only of the justified, those savingly related to God. (Christian Theology, 966)
Thus, when Luther described the Church as the congregation of the justified and Calvin as the sum total of God's elect throughout time, known only to God (2 Tim 2:19) and marked by the true preaching of the Word and the administration of the sacraments, they did so with reference to Augustine as the patristic foundation and chief proponent of this teaching and the interpretation of Scripture on which it is based. This claim is more striking than it might seem at first. Did Augustine really espouse a prototypical form of the invisible-visible church distinction which would only be taken up and given its proper place a thousand years later by the reformers?

The father of the west states something like this idea in his work On Christian Doctrine 3.32 (actually in the context of describing the seven "rules" or teachings of the heretic Tichonius, but he seems to be in agreement about the rules themselves). He writes:
The second rule is about the twofold division of the body of the Lord; but this indeed is not a suitable name, for that is really no part of the body of Christ which will not be with Him in eternity. We ought, therefore, to say that the rule is about the true and the mixed body of the Lord, or the true and the counterfeit, or some such name; because, not to speak of eternity, hypocrites cannot even now be said to be in Him, although they seem to be in His Church. And hence this rule might be designated thus: Concerning the mixed Church. Now this rule requires the reader to be on his guard when Scripture, although it has now come to address or speak of a different set of persons, seems to be addressing or speaking of the same persons as before, just as if both sets constituted one body in consequence of their being for the time united in a common participation of the sacraments. An example of this is that passage in the Song of Solomon, I am black, but comely, as the tents of Kedar, as the curtains of Solomon. (Song of Songs 1:5) For it is not said, I was black as the tents of Kedar, but am now comely as the curtains of Solomon. The Church declares itself to be at present both; and this because the good fish and the bad are for the time mixed up in the one net. (Matthew 13:47-48) For the tents of Kedar pertain to Ishmael, who shall not be heir with the son of the free woman. (Galatians 4:30) And in the same way, when God says of the good part of the Church, I will bring the blind by a way that they knew not; I will lead them in paths that they have not known; I will make darkness light before them, and crooked things straight: these things will I do unto them, and not forsake them; (Isaiah 42:16) He immediately adds in regard to the other part, the bad that is mixed with the good, They shall be turned back. Now these words refer to a set of persons altogether different from the former; but as the two sets are for the present united in one body, He speaks as if there were no change in the subject of the sentence. They will not, however, always be in one body; for one of them is that wicked servant of whom we are told in the gospel, whose lord, when he comes, shall cut him asunder and appoint him his portion with the hypocrites. (Matthew 24:50-51)
Elsewhere, in On Baptism 5.27, he writes that the presence of both the godly and the ungodly in the Church at the present time does not falsify Scriptures testifying to the purity and holiness of the Church, as they are speaking of the predestined, those whom God knows are his:
And in that the Church is thus described in the Song of Songs, "A garden enclosed is my sister, my spouse; a spring shut up, a fountain sealed, a well of living water; your plants are an orchard of pomegranates, with pleasant fruits;" (Song of Songs 4:12-13) I dare not understand this save of the holy and just,— not of the covetous, and defrauders, and robbers, and usurers, and drunkards, and the envious, of whom we yet both learn most fully from Cyprian's letters, as I have often shown, and teach ourselves, that they had baptism in common with the just, in common with whom they certainly had not Christian charity. For I would that some one would tell me how they "crept into the garden enclosed and the fountain sealed," of whom Cyprian bears witness that they renounced the world in word and not in deed, and that yet they were within the Church. For if they both are themselves there, and are themselves the bride of Christ, can she then be as she is described "without spot or wrinkle," (Ephesians 5:27) and is the fair dove defiled with such a portion of her members? Are these the thorns among which she is a lily, as it is said in the same Song? (Song of Songs 2:2) ... The number, therefore, of the just persons, "who are the called according to His purpose," (Romans 8:28) of whom it is said, "The Lord knows them that are His," (2 Timothy 2:19) is itself "the garden enclosed, the fountain sealed, a well of living water, the orchard of pomegranates with pleasant fruits." ... For, in that unspeakable foreknowledge of God, many who seem to be without are in reality within, and many who seem to be within yet really are without. Of all those, therefore, who, if I may so say, are inwardly and secretly within, is that "enclosed garden" composed, "the fountain sealed, a well of living water, the orchard of pomegranates, with pleasant fruits."
Augustine seems to be making exactly the same distinction that the reformers did, between a visible Church composed of a mixture of true and false believers, of the predestined and the reprobate (it bears reminding that predestination was one of the areas in which Augustine departed from the consensus of the rest of the patristic fathers) and the true Church composed of those whom God knows are his. Like Calvin, he cites 2 Timothy 2:19 in support of this idea; he also draws from the imagery of the parables of the wheat and the weeds (Matthew 13:24-30) and the dragnet (Matthew 13:47-50) to describe the present Church as a mixture of those who will be welcomed into the Kingdom and those who will be turned away at the last judgment.

Yet if you look at the context in which Augustine utilized this picture of the Church, you see that he did so in a way that differs sharply from the reformers. Augustine was responding to the claims of the Donatists, a schismatic, rigorist Christian sect (to which Tichonius somewhat inconsistently belonged) that held that the Church had to be holy, composed of saints rather than sinners, and that its very unity and catholicity depended on its holiness. They believed that the Church at-large had fallen into corruption and abandoned the true faith, except of course for the Donatist churches, by receiving and restoring traditores, Christians who had handed over copies of the Scriptures to escape persecution. They believed that this and other serious sins disqualified a Christian from roles of leadership, even after penance; any sacraments administered by a traditor bishop were invalid, and churches under the authority of traditores were not part of the one Church. The Church, to be holy, had to be led, and the grace mediated through the sacraments administered, by those who were still capable of doing so, who were not put themselves out of the Church by such sin.

In response to this, the Catholic/Orthodox (Catholodox?) Church taught that the grace mediated through the sacraments works ex opere operato, "from the work having been done"; that is, it is dependent only on the holiness of God in which the Church shares, not on the holiness of the officiant. Rather than the holiness of the Church depending on the holiness of its earthly members, Christians are made holy through their sharing in the holiness of God and his bride, the Church.

This is the context in which Augustine wrote against the Donatists. He sought to account for the apostasy and unholiness of many of the Church's members while undercutting the heretics' call to separate from the visible Church by upholding the continuing holiness of the one Church herself. In the present age, the Church is like the field in which both wheat and weeds have been sown, or the net in which both good and bad fish are caught. At the end of the age, God will separate the two, but until then, we should not be shocked that they are mixed together in one Church, and we certainly shouldn't go into schism over it! (For we will very quickly find that the new, schismatic "church" is little better) We Christians are charged with sharing in God's holiness, a project that will not be perfected in this life, yet our failures and faults do not endanger the holiness of the Church, which comes from Christ rather than her earthly members.

...and through to the Reformation

How does this bear on the reformers' use of Augustine? When he says things like "for that is really no part of the body of Christ which will not be with Him in eternity" (On Christian Doctrine 3.32), or "For in the ineffable foreknowledge of God, many who seem to be outside are actually within, just as many who seem to be within are in reality outside" (On Baptism 5.27), he certainly sounds a lot like them. Yet at the same time he vigorously opposed the possibility of schism from the visible Church, which he certainly still considered to be essentially one. His description of the Church as the collection of the predestined was not used to justify the division of the visible Church while affirming its continuing, invisible unity, but to affirm its visible and invisible unity in spite of the unholiness of its members. The Church may be a mixture of light and dark in its worldly existence, yet it remains one. Jaroslav Pelikan writes in his history of Christian doctrine:
[Augustine's] definition of the church as the "number of the predestined" was to figure prominently in the polemics of the late Middle Ages and the Reformation against the institutional church, but in Augustine's theology it has precisely the opposite function. It enabled him to accept a distinction between the members of the empirical catholic church and the company of those who would be saved, while at the same time he insisted that the empirical catholic church was the only one in which salvation was dispensed; 'for it is the church that gives birth to all.' Although God predestined, 'we, on the basis of what each man is right now, inquire whether today they are to be counted as members of the church.' It was to the church as now constituted that one was to look for grace, for guidance, and for authority. Those who accepted 'the authority of the Scriptures as preeminent' should also acknowledge 'that authority which from the time of the [earthly] presence of Christ, through the dispensation of the apostles and through a regular succession of bishops in their seats, has been preserved to our own day throughout the world.' (1.303)
Briefly applying this to the parables of Christ that Augustine draws from, we note that in both parables, the ones who draw the distinction between good seed and bad, or between good fish and bad, and who carry out the work of separating between the two, are God and his angels (13:37,39,49)—and this separation happens at the end of the age. (vv. 40,49) In the parable of the wheat, the sower (God) warns his harvesters (the angels) against gathering up the weeds prematurely, because they might uproot some of the wheat with them. (That is, seeking to weed out false Christians at the present might bring about the loss of some who would otherwise have found salvation)

Thus the end of the age, the final harvest, is when the present impurity of the earthly Church, the presence of hypocrites and the unholy within and of the righteous without, will be fully resolved, and the Church as a whole will at last be "on earth as it is in heaven". Those who, like the Donatists, attempt to purify the Church through schism are attempting to carry out the judgment God will perform at the end of the age, before the appointed time and with their own limited human knowledge and wisdom. Thus Augustine's distinction between true and false members of the body of Christ, far from justifying any attempt to separate out the two through schism, would instead condemn such efforts as a betrayal of the unity of the Church and a usurpation of God's role as judge.

Thus I think that Augustine's argument, when read in its context, argues against his later use by the reformers rather than supporting it. In fact, the interpretation used by the early Protestants, that the true Church is the number of God's elect regardless of visible church affiliation, would have played right into the Donatists' hands, justifying their split from the catholic Church to escape what they saw as its apostasy (while maintaining their membership in the invisible Church) rather than militating against it. Fr. Stephen Freeman, who has lately been blogging on ecumenism and the unity of the Church, writes that although the idea of a "hidden Church" consisting only of the truly faithful known only to God dates at least back to Augustine as we have just seen, the novelty introduced by the Reformation is that "for the first time, this collection is abstracted from the actual, historical manifestation of the Church." The adjective "faithful", in Protestant usage, loses its specific foundation in the apostolic faith of the one historic Church and takes on a much more nebulous, generalized meaning (that still somehow excludes Catholics).

In significant ways, then, the early reformers resembled their chosen church father Augustine less than they did the Donatists that he rebuked. Yet they also differed in other ways, which would prove to be problematic as well. Chief among these is the fact that the Donatists still considered the Church to be visible and one; they simply considered themselves to be the last faithful remnant of it. In the later Chalcedonian and Great Schisms as well, both parties considered themselves to be the continuation of the one indivisible Church—in accordance with their common ecclesiology, albeit in contradiction to each others' claims. But with the Reformation (and the figures preceding it, like Wycliffe and Hus) we see something new. Though the unity of the Church is still seen as essential to its nature in some way, this apparently no longer prevents it from being disrupted or broken.
At the dawning of the sixteenth century, in spite of the corruption that prevailed in many quarters, and of the many voices clamoring for reformation, there was general agreement among Christians that the church was in essence one, and that its unity must be seen in its structure and hierarchy. ... Most of the major Protestant leaders did believe that the unity of the Church was essential to its nature, and that therefore, although it was temporarily necessary to break that unity in order to be faithful to the Word of God, that their very faithfulness demanded that all possible efforts be made to regain their lost unity. (Justo Gonzalez, The Story of Christianity 1.163)
To a classical Christian, the possibility of breaking the unity of the one body of Christ would have been unthinkable, impossible, precisely because that unity is essential to what the Church is. But not so anymore. Instead of one of its basic, defining traits, after the Reformation the unity of the Church becomes an ideal to strive for, desirable but not currently realized. Later movements like the Disciples of Christ and the modern ecumenical movement would do just that. Pelikan contrastingly describes Augustine's theology thus:
Unity, on the other hand, was not the final result of a long process of growth, but the immediate and necessary corollary of grace. 'If baptism is the sacrament of grace while the grace itself is the abolition of sins, then the grace of baptism is not presence among heretics (although baptism is). Thus there is one baptism and one church, just as there is one faith.' The one sin that threatened the church [during the Donatist crisis] was not the adultery or even the private apostasy of a bishop, but schism. (Pelikan 1.311)
If I had to briefly summarize the difference between Augustine's ecclesiology and its later use by the reformers, I would put it this way: Augustine drew his distinction between the visible, mixed Church and the invisible, true Church in the context of a strong affirmation of the essential unity of the Church in order to oppose a schism. The reformers picked it up in the context of at least a practical denial of the essential unity of the Church in order to justify many schisms.

Consequences of an essentially invisible Church

This shift in ecclesiology had the effect of relativizing (or outright ignoring) the promises of classical ecclesiology as they pertained to the visible Church: it was no longer essentially, indivisibly one, only the invisible, "true" Church was. This invisible Church was also no longer related in any definite way to the visible one. There was not even one particular visible church body; any body meeting certain criteria or possessing certain "marks" was believed to be a manifestation of the invisible, true Church. In this way, it was believed, the Church remained one, holy, catholic, and apostolic, despite the increasing divisions being wrought in its visible outworking.
For although the sad devastation which everywhere meets our view may proclaim that no Church remains, let us know that the death of Christ produces fruit, and that God wondrously preserves his Church, while placing it as it were in concealment. (Calvin, Institutes IV.1.2)
In concealment, but also in abstraction. Freeman comments: "For the modern world has completely re-thought the matter of the Christian Church, and the state of things today is the result. In particular, modern Christians have largely lost the ability to think of the Church as “One,” in any way that is not a vague, nebulous unity of abstraction." Insisting that the Church is one in some invisible, abstract way cannot but alter our working definition of "unity", generalizing it until it means little more than a sentiment of warm-heartedness, mutual appreciation, or willingness to cooperate, expressed by gestures of hospitality like joint prayer, the sharing of preachers, and open communion. Just as I was composing this, Peter Enns articulated the same sort of difference between unity in general and unity in particular: "When we are talking 'general' unity, it’s all good. But when we get to specifics, things get awkward." No amount of wordplay can change the fact that the invisible Church of the modern world is not "One" or "united" in any way remotely resembling how the ancient Church was. Freeman continues in a follow-up post:
My writing painfully about the meaning of union and the One Church, is not to argue about the status of various Christian “Churches.” ... Rather, it is first to return the meaning of “One Church” to its proper place, with all of the pain and scandal that attends it. The One Church is ultimately found in One Cup, and there, only through true repentance and acceptance of the fullness of the faith. And if we are not there, then at least we must say so and cry out to God. He gives grace to the humble and resists the proud. It is beyond arrogance to say we are one when we are not. There can be no communion in a lie, or only a communion of death.
Another effect of this new ecclesiology is that it subjectivizes membership in the Church. The marks used to identify the presence of this Church, like sincere and true preaching of the Scriptures, the right administration of the sacraments, belief in some "essential" Christian doctrines, or simply an authentic, heart-felt inner faith are all just that—subjectively discerned. They cannot simply be seen; they have to be evaluated. Different groups will evaluate them differently. The turmoil and conflicts of the early Reformation make this abundantly clear; Calvin would not have included Catholic churches as manifestations of the true Church, and were they following his criteria Catholics would likely not have said the same of Reformed churches either. Membership in the true Church (or equivalently, being "saved" or simply being a "true Christian") all become subjectively defined, invisible even to the individual in question, a matter of opinion, a value judgment. It becomes impossible to speak of the extent of the Church without making at least an implicit pronouncement on the state of the faith of others.

One last consequence is the multiplication of visible divisions in the church(es). In his extensive analysis, The Unintended Reformation, Brad S. Gregory writes that "having rejected the authority of the Roman church, Protestants shared no institutions or authorities in common to which they could turn to resolve disputes among themselves." (369) In the case of a disagreement on doctrine or practice, the easiest and most natural course of action was no longer to have a council or bishop adjudicate and expect both parties to abide by their decision, but simply to let them go their separate ways, believing and worshipping according to their consciences while still remaining somehow "one". So with Luther and Zwingli, so with the magisterial reformers and the early Anabaptists, so with the colonists who fled to American to practice their religion in peace. As I said in my last post on the subject, the Donatist controversy (and every other controversy in the early Church) would have ended very differently if this approach had been the prevalent one; there would probably still be a Donatist church (or churches) to this day. In such a system heresies can no longer be silenced; instead they simply continue coexisting separately alongside the parent church that turned them out, claiming to still be part of the same invisible Church. And who can tell them differently? Pelikan, describing the Catholic Church's rebuttal to Jan Hus' view of the Church, writes: "For while it was true that the predestinate were the ones who made the church 'the true body of Christ,' the Hussite definition would destroy all certainty about the church and with it all ability to function in the church." (4.75-76) There is certainly truth to such concerns.

On a more personal level, the subjectivism and fissiparousness of invisible-church ecclesiology gave rise to the "sea of relativism" I felt trapped in while seeking answers to my questions about the Bible—how to read and apply it, its place in the Christian faith, its relation to Jesus as the Word of God—and the gospel—atonement, the relationship between faith and works, Paul's view on the law, and the basic nature of salvation.  I was confused and questioning all of these things, and there were no definite answers that I could see, only a multiplicity of possibilities and Christian traditions I could turn to in order to validate them. Which one represented the truth? I couldn't see any way to tell, and they couldn't all be right. I saw no choice but to search for the truth on my own, independently of any church tradition, acutely aware of the implicit individualism of this quest. All I had to show for it were possibilities and theories, ideals that were much better represented in Christian academia than any church I knew of. Any faith I constructed from my readings and theologizings would be little more than a cognitive web of ideas more of my own creation than God's, a far cry from the all-embracing life that the Christian faith is supposed to be.

Excursus: The branch theory

I only briefly touched on the branch theory in my last post. Basically, it is a theory within Anglican theology that the three major Christian communions claiming apostolic succession (Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and the Anglican Communion) do not truly represent schisms in the Church, but rather are "branches" of the one holy catholic and apostolic Church. This theory is a non-starter for Orthodox theology for several reasons.
  1. It is even more innovative than the invisible-church theory; I have never heard anyone claim it dates back to before the nineteenth century, let alone that it was taught in the early Church. This inspires little confidence that it is not also an attempt to explain the visible division of the Christian churches and avoid the need to rejoin the Catholics (or Orthodox).
  2. It also strains and abstractifies the definition of "unity" just as much as the invisible-church theory. In what meaningful, concrete sense can church bodies that deny each other communion and teach radically different faiths (in the case of Anglicanism, there are radical internal differences between the evangelical and Anglo-catholic wings, precipitating the archbishop's recent decision to reorganize the Communion into a looser affiliation) constitute one Church? The Catholic author Adrian Fortescue rightly writes of the Eastern Orthodox: "The idea of a church made up of mutually excommunicate bodies that teach different articles of faith and yet altogether form one Church is as inconceivable to them as it is to us [Catholics]." To both of these churches, "faith" does not describe a sentiment or general conviction; it is specific and content-laden. Fr. Freeman explains: "the One Church had always known what 'faithful' meant. It meant to accept without reservation the one faith of the one Church and to live in conformity with her canons and teachings. This was the ship of salvation established by Christ."
  3. Its opening admission that the Church has fallen into schism within itself amounts to an outright denial of its unity.

The fullness of him who fills all in all

To (re)introduce the Orthodox perspective on the nature of the Church, I'll quote Bishop Kallistos Ware at length, who says it much better than I can (with my own comments interspersed).
The Church—the icon of the Trinity, the Body of Christ, the fullness of the Spirit—is both visible and invisible, divine and human. It is visible, for it is composed for specific congregations, worshipping here on earth; it is invisible, for it also includes the saints and the angels. It is human, for its earthly members are sinners; it is divine, for it is the Body of Christ. There is no separation between the visible and the invisible, between (to use western terminology) the Church militant and the Church triumphant, for the two make up a single and continuous reality. "The Church visible, or upon earth, lives in complete communion and unity with the whole body of the Church, of which Christ is the Head.' it stands at a point of intersection between the Present Age and the Age to Come, and it lives in both Ages at once.
Ware recognizes Augustine's distinction between the visible and invisible dimensions of the one Church while expanding them both. The Church is visible, earthly, human, and mixed, but it is also invisible, heavenly, divine, and pure. Before it was ever used to argue against the invisible-church theory, the dogma of the unity of the Church was an affirmation of the indivisibility of these two realities of the Church. The key to this unity, as Ware argues at the end of this paragraph, is eschatology: at present, the Church is still a work in progress, but viewed through the lens of eschatology the Church is glorified and perfect. But that contrast isn't the end of it: Orthodox believe that through the incarnation, through the cross and the resurrection in particular, the eschaton, the age to come, the End (see Rev 21:6) has broken into the present, and that in the Church these two realities exist on top of one another. Fr. Freeman puts it this way: "[Christ's prayer 'that they may all be one'] is a prayer that will indeed have an eschatological fulfillment: 'All things will be gathered together in one…' But in Christ, the Eschaton has already come. We may eat and drink of that One and become the life of the One fulfilled in this world."
Orthodoxy, therefore, while using the phrase 'the Church visible and invisible', insists always that there are not two Churches, but one. As Khomiakov said:
"It is only in relation to man that it is possible to recognize a division of the Church into visible and invisible; its unity is, in reality, true and absolute. Those who are alive on earth, those who have fulfilled their earthly course, those who, like the angels, were not created for a life on earth, those in future generations who have not yet begun their earthly course, are all united together in one Church, in one and the same grace of God ... The Church, the Body of Christ, manifests forth and fulfils itself in time, without changing its essential unity or inward life of grace. And therefore, when we speak of 'the Church visible and invisible', we so speak only in relation to man."
The Church, according to Khomiakov, is accomplished on earth without losing its essential characteristics. This is a cardinal point in Orthodox teaching. Orthodoxy does not believe merely in an ideal Church, invisible and heavenly. This 'ideal Church' exists visible on earth as a concrete reality.
This is, roughly, how Orthodox account for the present discrepancy between the visible imperfection of the Church and the language of perfection applied to her in the Scriptures. It is not that only the invisible Church is the true one, and visible gatherings of truly faithful Christians, regardless of church affiliation, are manifestations of it (this explanation reeks of Platonic dualism). Because the end of the ages has come upon us (1 Cor 10:11) in the form of the resurrected Lord, it is possible to affirm that the visible, human, concrete Church is, by the sacramental grace of God, already the eschatological, purified bride of Christ. Through our present, visible participation in the concrete Church we are blessed to be able to join in the heavenly worship offered to God by the angels in the heavenly Church, for these two Churches are one. To separate them because of that which is passing away is to redefine the Church on our own, human terms.

How can this mysterious union of this age and the age to come be? The Incarnation shows how:
Yet Orthodoxy tries not to forget that there is a human element in the Church as well as a divine. The dogma of Chalcedon must be applied to the Church as well as to Christ, Just as Christ the God-man has two natures, divine and human, so in the Church there is a synergy or co-operation between the divine and the human.
Here Ware describes the analogy between the incarnate Christ and the Church, his body. The Church is both fully divine and fully human in something like the way that Jesus is (and the Scriptures as well). There is thus a congruency between ecclesiology and Christology. Vladimir Lossky fleshes this out further, describing the invisible-church theory as the ecclesiological analogue of the Nestorian heresy:
The Church, in its Christological aspect, appears as an organism having two natures, two operations and two wills. In the history of Christian dogma all the Christological heresies come to life anew and reappear with reference to the Church. Thus, there arises a Nestorian ecclesiology, the error of those who would divide the Church into distinct beings: on the one hand the heavenly and invisible Church, alone true and absolute; on the other, the earthly Church (or rather 'the churches') imperfect and relative, wandering in the shadows, human societies seeking to draw near, so far as is possible for them, to that transcendent perspective. (The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, 186)
He goes on to describe a monophysite ecclesiology as the divinization of every detail of the Church and resultant inflexibility (as seen in the old believer schism), a monothelite ecclesiology ("a negation of the economy of the Church in regard to the external world"), and its opposite, an over-readiness to compromise and sacrifice the truth in order to adapt to the external world. But just as Christ is fully God and fully man "unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably" and without denigrating either nature, so the one Church is both visible and invisible, earthly and heavenly, of this age and the age to come.

Ware continues to describe the mystery:
Yet between Christ's humanity and that of the Church there is this obvious difference, that the one is perfect and sinless, while the other is not yet fully so. Only a part of the humanity of the Church—the saints in heaven—has attained perfection, while here on earth the Church's members often misuse their human freedom. The Church on earth exists in a state of tension: it is already the body of Christ, and thus perfect and sinless, and yet, since its members are imperfect and sinful, it must continually become what it is. [Footnote: 'This idea of "becoming what you are" is the key to the whole eschatological teaching of the New Testament']
But human sin cannot affect the essential nature of the Church. We must not say that because Christians on earth sin and are imperfect, therefore the Church sins and is imperfect, for the Church, even on earth, is a thing of heaven and cannot sin. How is it that the members of the Church are sinners, and yet they belong in the communion of saints? 'The mystery of the Church consists in the very fact that together sinners become something different from what they are as individuals; this "something different" is the Body of Christ.
So I was wrong last time when I said that the Church does not basically consist of people. It does, yet because of its incarnational, eschatological nature, its essential nature as the one holy catholic and apostolic body of Christ is not damaged or destroyed by the impurity of its earthly members.
Such is the way in which Orthodoxy approaches the mystery of the Church. The Church is integrally linked with God. It is a new life according to the image of the Holy Trinity, a life in Christ and in the Holy Spirit, a life realized by participation in the sacraments. The Church is a single reality, earthly and heavenly, visible and invisible, human and divine.
This paragraph beautifully summarizes the reality of the Church and how its unity fits seamlessly into this. The late Fr. Thomas Hopko similarly writes: "Within the unity of the Church man is what he is created to be and can grow for eternity in divine life in communion with God through Christ in the Holy Spirit. The unity of the Church is not broken by time or space and is not limited merely to those alive upon the earth. The unity of the Church is the unity of the Blessed Trinity and of all of those who live with God: the holy angels, the righteous dead, and those who live upon the earth according to the commandments of Christ and the power of the Holy Spirit."

To finish the Ware quote:
'The Church is one. Its unity follows of necessity from the unity of God.' So wrote Khomiakov in the opening words of his famous essay. If we take seriously the bond between God and His Church, then we must inevitably think of the Church as one, even as God is one: there is only one Christ, and so there can be only one Body of Christ. Nor is this unity merely ideal and invisible; Orthodox theology refuses to separate the 'invisible' and the 'visible Church', and therefore it refuses to say that the Church is invisibly one but visibly divided. No: the Church is one, in the sense that here on earth there is a single, visible community which alone can claim to be the true Church. The 'undivided Church' is not merely something that existed in the past, and which we hope will exist again in the future; it is something that exists here and now. Unity is one of the essential characteristics of the Church, and since the Church on earth, despite the sinfulness of its members, retains its essential characteristics, it remains and always will remain visibly one. There can be schisms from the Church, but no schisms within the Church. And while it is undeniably true that, on a purely human level, the Church's life is grievously impoverished as a result of schisms, yet such schisms cannot affect the essential nature of the Church.
Hopefully this sets Ware's closing affirmation, that there can be schisms from the Church but not within it, in its proper context. The unity of the body of Christ precludes not only the possibility of it being divided into pieces (or branches), but also the separation of its visible and invisible (or present and eschatological, or divine and human, or earthly and heavenly) dimensions. It is this very unity that assures its holiness, catholicity, and apostolicity; when we worship with the Church, we can be confident that we worship in the fullness of the faith once delivered, not merely in an imperfect human attempt to reconstruct it. The Church and membership in it are objectively, visibly defined; there is no room for ambiguity or controversy about what and where the Church is. This averts the consequences of the invisible-church theory I have described.

I would argue that this perspective on the Church resembles that of Augustine much more than the invisible-church theory. It does not legitimate schism; it denies the possibility of it, just as he did. It distinguishes between the visible and invisible dimensions of the Church as he did, while denying that they should or can be separated. It does not call for speculation into the state of other believers in order to trace the extent of the Church, but arises from the humility that views oneself as the worst all sinners. As Augustine said, "we, on the basis of what each man is right now, inquire whether today they are to be counted as members of the church." And if I, the first of the sinners, am counted worthy to be a member of the Church, how can I judge anyone else who has not put himself out of the body as unworthy? Of course, Augustine's perspective differs from that of the rest of the fathers in his one-sided approach to predestination and particular use of it when describing the invisible Church, as is well-known, but this does not invalidate his point.

Some closing questions

Why is all this important?
Why am I spilling all this virtual ink on a subject that I've already covered? In part, to show how it is possible to have very diverse views on something while affirming the same foundational statement ("one holy catholic and apostolic Church") about it. Though its adherents might claim to affirm the Creed, the invisible-church theory is an innovation; it is not how Christians have viewed the Church from the beginning, but rather uses familiar language to say something new. I have tried to express this as clearly as possible. This difference is not trivial; if one theory is true, the other cannot be.

With that said, perhaps the biggest reason I find the Orthodox teaching on the unity of the Church compelling is that it makes that unity so much more meaningful and coherent. It is no longer an abstraction, and neither is the Church. It now means something concrete to say that the Church is one: it is one body, praying and teaching one faith, united to God and the whole communion of saints through its eucharistic union with Christ by means of the One Cup, as Fr. Freeman was quoted as saying earlier. As well, this unity harmonizes perfectly, dare I say beautifully, with the unity of God, of Christ (whose body it is), of his humanity and divinity, of the Holy Spirit indwelling it.

Compared to this, the invisible-church theory feels like a compromise, a consolation, a quasi-Platonic denial of the reality of the visible disunity in favor of an intangible "spiritual" unity. Yet at the same time, no one would have adopted it without first concluding that the Church is visibly divided (else there would be nothing to explain)—the result of a judgment based too much on external impressions rather than faith in the unity of God. Yet Paul writes, "From now on, therefore, we regard no one according to the flesh." (2 Cor 5:16) This interpretation places strain on the very concepts of "one" or "unity". It does not integrate seamlessly with the unity of God and the incarnation. How can the body of Christ be spiritually one yet visibly divided? No, there is not one invisible, spiritual Church that we must find and convince ourselves has remained whole through all the denominational divisions; there is one particular, visible, incarnational Church, and so there has been from the beginning.

Isn't it arrogant to claim that your church is the One True Church?
Something I should have made clear to my Protestant friends a long time ago: My claim to be joining the "one holy catholic and apostolic Church" (which does implicitly exclude your church) is not a claim about the authenticity of your personal faith or salvation in any way, though I think it is often taken that way. Again, Orthodoxy strongly discourages speculation about the authenticity of the faith of others; first remove the plank from your own eye. Nor is it a claim that the Orthodox Church is somehow "better" or "truer" than the visible church body you are a part of. (Though I have definitely been guilty of this in the past) A few months ago Fr. Freeman wrote strikingly about Orthodox triumphalism:
the Orthodox Church is not better than some other Church. If you declare such a thing to be true, then you have actually denied the truth of Orthodoxy. We believe the Church to be One. We believe the Church is One because God is One. And, as in the case of God, it is One of which there is not two. If Orthodoxy is The Church, then it’s not the better Church. It is not something that can be compared to anything else. ... As soon as comparisons are made, the Church is reduced to one among the many and the concept of “many churches” is granted, denying the declaration of the Creed. The Orthodox Church is not better – it simply is what it is.
In other words, the Orthodox Church does not somehow gain the "right" to call itself the one Church through any sort of comparison process with any other Church, like you might apply when selecting a church. It confesses that there is no other Church, nor can there be. It does not become the one Church by qualifying for the honor, nor by meeting any sort of criteria or by the possession of particular "marks". It simply is what it is, and it always has been. Ware fleshes this claim out more:
Orthodoxy, believing that the Church on earth has remained and must remain visibly one, naturally also believes itself to be that one visible Church. This is a bold claim, and to many it will seem an arrogant one; but this is to misunderstand the spirit in which it is made. Orthodox believe that they are the true Church, not on account of any personal merit, but by the grace of God. They say with St. Paul, 'We are no better than pots of earthenware to contain this treasure; the sovereign power comes from God and not from us' (2 Corinthians iv, 7). But while claiming no credit for themselves, Orthodox are in all humility convinced that they have received a precious and unique gift from God; and if they pretended to others that they did not possess this gift, they would be guilty of an act of betrayal in the sight of heaven. (The Orthodox Church 246)
It actually feels liberating not to have to argue that the status of the Orthodox Church makes it "better" or "truer" than all other churches. There is plenty that is regrettable in the Church's history, and plenty that is praiseworthy in other communions, but this is because of the liberality and uncontainability of grace, not because of any abstraction of the Church. Orthodox are primarily interested in defining where the Church is, not identifying places where it isn't. Orthodoxy prefers to pay focus on the center of the Church (that is, Christ) rather than nail down its precise boundaries.

How do I view concerns for the unity of the Church as a questioning Protestant?
I still remember how ardently concerned I used to be for this thing call "church unity". I was deeply concerned with all the ugly conflicts, the misunderstandings, not to mention the differences in teaching and practice among those calling themselves Christians. I believed, as I still do, that it harms and hinders the witness of all Christians to the world. I dreamed of the healing of these divisions and how I could possibly be a part of it. Yet my concern sprang from my trusting my own impressions of disunity and division rather than the promises of God and the biblical account of the nature of the Church. Like so many others, I believed that the promised original unity of the Church was merely incidental, something that human error had since broken and that needed to be put back together again.

I am relieved that I was mistaken. There's no doubt that the urgency of my earlier ecumenical concerns has lessened as a result, but I still identify with Paul's wish "that there be no divisions among you, but that you be joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment" (1 Cor 1:10)—though in my actions I feel like I work to subvert that harmony as often as I build it up. There is a certainly nothing wrong with the measures I used to have in mind for healing divisions among the churches, like increased cooperation and more-aligned teaching between denominations and communions, but these advances cannot create the organic, one-body unity that Orthodox see in the Church. Again, the unity of the Church is not a project or an ideal, something future that one day may be accomplished. It is an eternal reality, a consequence of the oneness of God. The most "ecumenical" gesture I or any Christian can make is to simply join it, not to try to recreate it.

How would I answer my lingering doubts on the unity of the Church from last time?
The Chalcedonian and Great Schisms certainly stand as the most convincing counterexamples to the teaching I have presented. All of the parties involved agree that these schisms weren't qualitatively different than others, they didn't actually break the Church in two; they only differ in scale, and the fact that both sides of the schisms have continued existing as separate churches into the present. This continuation of both sides of a schism raises the natural question: how do Orthodox, or Catholics, or the Oriental Orthodox, or any church with apostolic succession know that theirs is the true Church and not the schismatic one? Don't their symmetrical claims cancel or disprove each other?

I don't think it's possible to "prove" which church is in the right, or these schisms would not have lasted so long. Does this mean these churches are stuck in the same sea of relativism that Protestants are? I don't think so. All of them still believe in the essential, incarnational unity of the Church. Their competing claims by no means entail that they are all wrong and that Protestant ecclesiology is right; their continuing agreement on the visible unity of the Church only strengthens the case for the truth of the teaching. In his latest post on unity and "un-ecumenism", Fr. Freeman writes:
Those who stand outside of Orthodoxy and point to the schisms between the Eastern and Oriental Orthodox, or the schism with the Roman Catholics, fail to understand what they see. Those schisms are real and they are indeed problems. But in each case, those involved have not renounced the reality of the One Church, nor the sacramental life of the One Cup. The schisms are something to be healed and are treated with great seriousness. But there can only be a true restoration of communion and union in the One Church. It is the very nature of that one life [that] is being preserved and proclaimed, even in the face of schism. If you will, the language and grammar of the One Church is spoken fluently in those ancient groups. Conversations are therefore possible. If, for example, a path of union were found between the Oriental and Orthodox Christians, it would not involve re-teaching the entire nature of what it means to be a Christian and what the character of that life looks like. Both speak the language of union.
There is no (or at least less) subjectivity in choosing between these churches because they all continue to believe that your choice between them matters. It matters immensely. You aren't simply choosing a visible church body that fits your convictions, conscience, and preferences while participating in the invisible Church through your authentic individual faith the whole time. You are searching for the one holy catholic and apostolic (and visible) Church. Catholics and both kinds of Orthodox all agree that only one of them can be it. Choose wisely.

With that said, I can at least give my reasons for choosing as I have. As a result of better communication, the growing consensus among Orthodox (confirmed by several meetings in the second half of the twentieth century) is that the schism with the Oriental Orthodox has been a 1500-year misunderstanding. There is no real disagreement between the churches, only the use of different words to express the same reality regarding Christ's humanity and divinity. They hold the same faith as the Orthodox Church, which would make a reunion a mere formality. And hopes for reunion are high, especially with the upcoming council next year. So it is actually possible (and hopefully the case) that the choice between Eastern and Oriental Orthodoxy (yes, the names mean the same thing) really doesn't matter, not any more than the choice between (say) the Greek or Russian Orthodox Churches matters. Perhaps if I'd read a book by an Oriental Orthodox first, I would be joining them instead. As it is, I look forward with hope to seeing the schism closed.

The Orthodox Church's differences with Rome are much better established and unlikely to be downgraded to a misunderstanding anytime soon. I believe the Orthodox Church has preserved the apostolic faith free from western distortions like the papacy and the Filioque; it is much easier for me to believe that these things are later additions to the faith (no one disputes the dating of the Filioque) than parts of the apostolic deposit. I don't think I should have to argue this point very rigorously to my predominantly Protestant audience. As well, the Orthodox Church has been preserved from the overriding rationalism and widespread corruption that gave birth to the Reformation, and through it modernity.

This post has gone on more than long enough. I'll close with one last extended quote by Cyprian of Carthage, a third-century bishop who wrote regarding a schism that broke out in his own diocese. As usual for the fathers, there is no hint that the unity of the Church only applies to its invisible dimension, or that the visible and invisible dimensions can be held apart at all. Rather, he presses hard for the essential unity of the Church with a variety of analogies, some of them quite beautiful—the marriage analogy, which I didn't have time to get into at present, is especially worth considering. More recent Orthodox don't share his hardliner attitude toward schismatics (it is directed at those who actually incite schisms, and tends to have the opposite of the intended effect on non-Orthodox Christians today), but his theological points stand.
Does he who does not hold this unity of the Church think that he holds the faith? Does he who strives against and resists the Church trust that he is in the Church, when moreover the blessed Apostle Paul teaches the same thing, and sets forth the sacrament of unity, saying, “There is one body and one spirit, one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God?” (Eph 4:4)
And this unity we ought firmly to hold and assert, especially those of us that are bishops who preside in the Church, that we may also prove the episcopate itself to be one and undivided. Let no one deceive the brotherhood by a falsehood: let no one corrupt the truth of the faith by perfidious prevarication. The episcopate is one, each part of which is held by each one for the whole. The Church also is one, which is spread abroad far and wide into a multitude by an increase of fruitfulness. As there are many rays of the sun, but one light; and many branches of a tree, but one strength based in its tenacious root; and since from one spring flow many streams, although the multiplicity seems diffused in the liberality of an overflowing abundance, yet the unity is still preserved in the source. Separate a ray of the sun from its body of light, its unity does not allow a division of light; break a branch from a tree,—when broken, it will not be able to bud; cut off the stream from its fountain, and that which is cut off dries up. Thus also the Church, shone over with the light of the Lord, sheds forth her rays over the whole world, yet it is one light which is everywhere diffused, nor is the unity of the body separated. Her fruitful abundance spreads her branches over the whole world. She broadly expands her rivers, liberally flowing, yet her head is one, her source one; and she is one mother, plentiful in the results of fruitfulness: from her womb we are born, by her milk we are nourished, by her spirit we are animated.
The spouse of Christ cannot be adulterous; she is uncorrupted and pure. She knows one home; she guards with chaste modesty the sanctity of one couch. She keeps us for God. She appoints the sons whom she has born for the kingdom. Whoever is separated from the Church and is joined to an adulteress, is separated from the promises of the Church; nor can he who forsakes the Church of Christ attain to the rewards of Christ. He is a stranger; he is profane; he is an enemy. He can no longer have God for his Father, who has not the Church for his mother. If any one could escape who was outside the ark of Noah, then he also may escape who shall be outside of the Church. The Lord warns, saying, “He who is not with me is against me, and he who gathereth not with me scattereth.” (Mat 12:30) He who breaks the peace and the concord of Christ, does so in opposition to Christ; he who gathereth elsewhere than in the Church, scatters the Church of Christ. The Lord says, “I and the Father are one;” (Jhn 10:30) and again it is written of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, “And these three are one.” (1 Jhn 5:7) And does any one believe that this unity which thus comes from the divine strength and coheres in celestial sacraments, can be divided in the Church, and can be separated by the parting asunder of opposing wills? He who does not hold this unity does not hold God’s law, does not hold the faith of the Father and the Son, does not hold life and salvation.
...
Who, then, is so wicked and faithless, who is so insane with the madness of discord, that either he should believe that the unity of God can be divided, or should dare to rend it—the garment of the Lord—the Church of Christ? He Himself in His Gospel warns us, and teaches, saying, “And there shall be one flock and one shepherd.” (Jhn 10:16) And does any one believe that in one place there can be either many shepherds or many flocks? The Apostle Paul, moreover, urging upon us this same unity, beseeches and exhorts, saying, “I beseech you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you; but that ye be joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment.” (1 Cor 1:10) And again, he says, “Forbearing one another in love, endeavouring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.” (Eph 4:3)
Cyprian of Carthage, On the Unity of the Church, 4-6,8

Wednesday, December 24, 2014

Excepts from Athanasius on the Incarnation

For Christmas this year, rather than putting up more thoughts of my own, I'll leave you with a few passages from Athanasius' On the Incarnation, a relatively short but very important work expressing the Orthodox theology of the Incarnation.
He, the mighty one, the artificer of all, himself prepared his body in the virgin as a temple for himself, and took it for his very own, as the instrument through which he was known and in which he dwelt. Thus, taking a body like our own, because all our bodies were liable to the corruption of death, he surrendered his body to death instead of all, and offered it to the father. This he did out of sheer love for us, so that in his death all might die, and the law of death thereby be abolished because, having fulfilled in his body that for which it was appointed, it was thereafter voided of its power for men. This he did that he might turn again to incorruption men who had turned back to corruption, and make them alive through death by the appropriation of his body and by the grace of his resurrection. Thus he would make death to disappear from them as utterly as straw from fire. (8)
As, then, he who desires to see God who by nature is invisible and not to be beheld, may yet perceive and know him through his works, so too let him who does not see Christ with his understanding at least consider him in his bodily works and test whether they be of man or of God. If they be of man, then let him scoff; but if they be of God, let him not mock things which are no fit subject for scorn, but rather let him recognize the fact and marvel that things divine have been revealed to us by such humble means, that through death deathlessness has been made known to us, and through the incarnation of the word the mind whence all things proceed has been declared, and its agent  and ordainer, the word of God himself.

He, indeed, assumed humanity that we might become god. He manifested himself by means of a body in order that we might perceive the mind of the unseen Father. He endured shame from men that we might inherit immortality. He himself was unhurt by this, for he is impassable and uncorruptible, but by his own impassability he kept and healed the suffering men on whose account he thus endured . In short, such and so many are the Savior's achievements that follow from his incarnation, that to try to number them is like gazing at the open sea and trying to count the waves. One cannot see all the waves with one's eyes, for when one tries to do so those that are following on baffle one's senses. Even so, when one wants to take in all the achievements of Christ in the body, one cannot do so, even by reckoning them up, for the things that transcend one's thought are always more than those one thinks that one has grasped. (54)

Sunday, October 5, 2014

Position Paper: Theology (Proper)

The following is the unabridged version of my second position paper for my systematic theology class. It was supposed to be 7-8 pages but turned out to be 22, so I only submitted the first half, on the nature of God, knowing I could post it in full here. The prompt this time was theology proper, that is, the study of what God is like in his nature and acts.

Today, Christian theology is a very broad field of study. There is the basic (but porous) division between biblical, systematic, historical, and philosophical theology, and within each of these are numerous sub-fields covering everything from the human condition to the nature of the biblical "covenant" to eschatology. But in its etymology, "theology" is simply the "logic" (study) of God (theos), the contemplation of the divine, a task that has engaged us for thousands of years and will continue to do so for as long as he remains beyond our full comprehension (that is, forever). It is to this narrower, more proper sense of the word "theology" that we now turn. At the slight but necessary risk of reductionism, I break down this study of God into two major parts: nature (what God is like) and acts (what God does). Each of these further breaks down: His nature into essential and moral attributes, and his acts into his roles as creator and sustainer.

Essential attributes

At the beginning of God's essential attributes (those intrinsic to his nature as "God") is his self-existence. This sounds banal, but God's nature as the self-existent one, the ultimate Reality, is both the most basic part of his nature and a major point of contact with philosophy. In the words of Aristotle, God is the "unmoved mover", the first cause without whom nothing else would exist. Or in God's own words, "I am who I am" (Exo 3:14, RSV). Similarly, in Orthodox iconography Jesus is always portrayed with the Greek words ho ōn, "the existing one" who has life (or existence) in himself (Jhn 5:26). Our existence seems concrete enough, but it is contingent on a number of things prior to ourselves. But there is nothing prior to God. As Tillich correctly (but incompletely) asserted, He is the ground of being for everything else that is. (Erickson 277-279)

Besides this, God is infinite in nearly every way we can imagine. He is omnipotent, or infinite in power, able to do all that he pleases (Psa 115:3). We see this demonstrated from the very first chapter of Genesis, where God simply speaks and the elements of the cosmos come into existence and obey his will, or Jesus' commanding the storm in Mat 8:23-27. It is the meaning of God's frequent title, "almighty" (Gen 17:1, 2 Cor 6:18). With God, all things are possible (Mat 19:26) and nothing is too hard (Jer 32:17), so that he is "able to do abundantly more than all we ask or think" (Eph 3:20); none of his purposes can be thwarted (Job 42:2). To avoid frivolous paradoxes like "Can God make a rock so big he can't lift it?", it's important to remember that God is able to do all that he wills to do; of course he does not will to act against his nature or create contradictions. The fact that God is not able to lie, break his promises, or create square circles is a strength, not a weakness.

God is omniscient, or infinite in his knowledge. This means, for one, that he has a perfect awareness of the operation of his whole creation, as he explains to Job in Job 38-41. "Before him no creature is hidden, but all are open and laid bare to the eyes of him with whom we have to do" (Heb 4:13). He is never ignorant of a situation, never lacking the necessary information to make a judgment. And his comprehension of this information is likewise infinite; "his understanding is beyond measure" (Psa 147.5). God's thoughts are as high above ours as the heavens are from the earth (Isa 55:8-9); the doxology in Rom 11:33-36 praises "the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God". We can never presume to correct God; we can never know better than God; he can only trust that his counsel is all-wise.

God is eternal, or infinite in time. God boldly describes himself as "the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end" (Rev 22:13); earlier he is praised as "the Lord God Almighty, who was and is and is to come" (4:8).  Being self-existent, it stands to reason that God has always existed and will always exist. It is a matter of speculation as to whether God progresses through time the same way we do (but with a perfect knowledge of the future) or whether he is outside our endless succession of moments; I lean toward the latter. C.S. Lewis holds this view, saying that "what we call 'tomorrow' is visible to Him in just the same way as what we call 'today'. All the days are 'Now' for Him." (Lewis 140) Additionally, God is constant; he does not fade, diminish, or change in any way through time (Psa 102:26-27 Mal 3:6, Jas 1:17).

God is also omnipresent, or infinite in extent, though with qualifications. Unlike we who can only be in one place at a time, God is not limited to occupy a certain location, nor does he need to travel from (say) one place of worship to another. He is "present" everywhere and "absent" nowhere. "'Do I not fill heaven and earth?', says the Lord" (Jer 23:24). Heaven is his throne and earth is his footstool (Isa 66:1); this is obviously not a literal statement but a powerful depiction both of God's lordship over the whole universe and his filling it. A corollary of this is God's immanence, or his constant presence with us. Because God is not bound by spatial constraints, "he is not far from each one of us" (Acts 17:27), and Jesus is able to say "I am with you always, to the close of the age" (Mat 28:20). David in Psalm 139:7-12 depicts this beautifully: even when he turns and flees from God, he can never escape his presence and his love.

But none of this should be taken to mean that God has a physical presence, even one that fills the universe. God is spirit, not made of matter or bound by any of the constraints of physicality (Jhn 4:24, Act 17:24); he is invisible (1 Tim 1:17) and no one has ever truly "seen" him (Jhn 1:18, 1 Tim 6:15-16), nor is it even possible for corporeal man to do so (Exo 33:20). Additionally God is transcendent, qualitatively higher and other than anything in the material world. This fact is part of the basis of the commandment against making idols of him (Exo 20:4). So Jesus, even with a human body, told his disciples that "I am not of this world" (Jhn 8:23). With no flight and no direct knowledge of the sky, the Bible is prone to using elevation as a metaphor for God's transcendence; he is "seated on high" (Psa 113:5), "enthroned in the heavens" (Psa 123:1); as previously mentioned, God's thoughts and ways are far above ours like the heavens above the earth (Isa 55:8-9). Verses that do seem to depict God with humanlike features or expressions should be understood as anthropomorphisms to communicate truth beyond our full understanding, rather than as literal truth.

Straddling God's natural and moral attributes is his personal nature. God is not distant and aloof from the world like the god of the deists, or an impersonal force, power, energy, etc. He is a distinct person with a name (given in Exo 3:14, mentioned in Gen 4:26, 12:8; Psa 20:7) who throughout the Bible is shown to have a specific will, desires, thoughts, and ideas, capable of interaction with created beings like us despite his transcendence (Genesis 3 portrays God very dynamically, for instance). Exodus 33:11 says that "the Lord used to speak to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend." Everything we are that makes us distinct persons, God also is, albeit in a qualitatively different and higher way than us.

Moral attributes

We move on to God's moral attributes (those that make him a morally good deity instead of neutral or evil). God is righteous, practicing steadfast love, justice, and righteousness on the earth and delighting in them (Jer 9:24). Gen 18:25 rhetorically asks "Shall not the judge of the earth do right?" (the answer is clearly 'yes'). Similarly God's commands are perfect, sure, right, pure, true, and righteous (Psa 19:7-9), corresponding to his good nature. Somewhat related to this, God is true, meaning both that he never lies (1 Sam 15:29, Tit 1:2) and his very word is truth (Jhn 17:17), and that he is the only true god, supremely worthy of our love and worship. (Jer 10:5-10, Jhn 17:3).

God is also holy. This intensifies God's righteousness; it means his absolute purity from all unrighteousness. God is morally perfect (Mat 5:48), unable to be tempted by evil (Jas 1:13). God repeatedly calls his people to be the same, as he is (Lev 11:44-45, Mat 5:48, 2 Cor 6:14-7:1). In light of this fact that the world and the people in it are not perfect, this means that God is morally as well as ontologically transcendent. Identification with him means separation from uncleanness in the corrupt world, though never a lack of concern for those in it (Isa 57:15). This was evident throughout the Mosaic law (see all the mentions of the word 'holy' in the book of Leviticus) and expressed with physical metaphors like the washing of hands; in the New Testament it is a more spiritual dissociation from the world and association with Christ (Jhn 17:14-16). God's holiness means that he is resolutely opposed to the sin and corruption in his creation, and if we want to follow him we have to change our allegiance.

As the Bible says, God is not merely loving but is love (1 Jhn 4:8,16). This doesn't mean we can project our own conceptions about what love is onto God or vice versa since our knowledge of both is incomplete, but that as we grow both in love and in personal knowledge of God, we can trust that they will align exactly. God demonstrated his love by electing Israel from among the nations to be his treasure (Deu 7:7-8) and sending his son for our salvation (Jhn 3:16), particularly by dying for our sins (1 Jhn 3:16, 4:10). God is benevolent, unconditionally concerned for the welfare of all of his creatures (Psa 57:10, 86:5, 103:13, 145:16), especially the lost, weak, or vulnerable (Deu 10:18, Mat 9:36). He is gracious, lavishing his love on us not according to merit but unconditionally, according to his mercy (Rom 5:6, Eph 1:4-8, Tit 3:3-7). He is patient, quick to forgive and slow to anger (Exo 34:6-7, Psa 86:15), in the hope that we will turn to him (Rom 2:4, 2 Pet 3:9,15). And he is faithful, dependably fulfilling all that he promises us (Num 23:19, 1 Th 5:24; this is also implied by his truthfulness).

God is also just. This means that his commands are, ultimately, enforced; no one is "above" his law. "'Vengeance is mine, I will repay', says the Lord." (Rom 12:19) Like a just judge, he punishes the wicked and rewards the righteous (Deu 7:9-10, Psa 58:11); life is ultimately 'fair' because of him. This does not mean that the wicked are punished immediately or as we may expect (Psalm 73 expresses dismay at this); God can even use one wicked nation to punish another (as Habakkuk learned). But on a larger scale, goodness will be rewarded and evil punished according to God's justice, specifically by the risen and glorified Christ. (Acts 17:31) God's justice means more than simply balancing the moral scales, though; it is his love and mercy distributed, especially to to those who are poor, vulnerable, and oppressed, who are viewed as recipients of justice irrespective of their moral status. (Exo 23:6; Psa 103:6, 140:12; Isa 1:17; Zec 7:9-10, Mat 12:18 [cite more in footnote]).

It's necessary here to correct a misunderstanding of justice as the necessity to punish sin or to demand "satisfaction" (something like Anselm's "debt of honor" owed by man to God for his sins (Pelikan 113) or a penalty for sin (Institutes 2.12.3)) as recompense for it. Combined with God's holiness as a sort of allergy to sin, it becomes a need to maintain a "divine spiritual economy" (Erickson 259) that is imbalanced by sin and, according to the demands of God's justice, must be set right by prosecution of the offense. This view of God's justice, which for us means that everyone faces God's wrath and deserves the punishment of hell for their sins (to satisfy God's need to punish sin, restore the moral economy, etc.), is viewed as conflicting with his love; the two are reconciled, it is supposed, by Jesus' work on the cross, in which Jesus took the punishment our sin requires (restoring the moral economy) and imputed to us his perfect, "alien" righteousness by which we merit salvation according to God's justice.

This view of God's justice implies that what we really need to be saved from is not so much our sin itself as God's wrath for our sins, that we would somehow be better off (or at least more comfortable) if he just left us in them, that his justice (rather than sin and death) is the enemy (Institutes 2.16.2) we are delivered from. We don't long for God's justice so much as we are mercifully spared from it. As well, it views justice through the lens of legalistic guilt and merit, making the upholding of an abstract moral economy the "point" of God's justice and painting him as "a distant bank manager, scrutinizing credit and debit sheets." (Wright 163) We are right to see this justice as in tension with God's love—it makes him capable only of accepting fair restitution for a debt rather than truly forgiving any sin. This justice is inward rather than outward-focused like God's other moral attributes, satisfied by receiving a repayment for debts owed rather than by giving mercy to the wronged and restoring the world to the way it should be. The punishment of those who pervert God's justice is a means to the end of restoring it, not the end itself.

The Trinity

As I stated above under God's transcendence, God is qualitatively higher and different than us, beyond our full comprehension. This is never more obvious than when dealing with two of the central mysteries of God and the Christian faith: the Trinity and the Incarnation. The Trinity is the mystery that Christians worship one Godhead existing in three divine persons, each of whom is fully God. More precisely, the ecumenical council of Constantinople (381), at the leading of the Cappadocian fathers Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa, established the orthodox formulation of the Trinity as "one ousia in three hypostaseis". (Erickson 305) The Greek words used here are difficult to translate accurately; "Godhead" and "persons" are some of the best attempts. Because of the confusion this teaching causes, it is a common object of criticism, especially from Jews and Muslims. It's worth noting that the threeness and the oneness are not in the same respect; otherwise the doctrine would be self-contradictory on its face.

Adding to the confusion, the Bible nowhere explicitly spells out the doctrine (Constantinople saw its first clear expression), yet it contains enough evidence pointing to it that the Trinity is considered as established a dogma of the church as anything else. First, the scriptures strongly testify that there is only one God. The shema in Deu 6:4-6 is the strongest statement of God's unity; Paul also affirms that "there is one God" in 1 Tim 2:5. But simultaneously, the divinity of the Father (Mat 6:26-30), Son (Mar 2:8-10, Jhn 8:58, Phl 2:5-11, Heb 1:1-4), and Holy Spirit (Acts 5:3-4; 1 Cor 3:16-17, 6:19-20) is affirmed. In a few places we see all three working together (Mat 3:16-17, Gal 4:6) or mentioned at once (Mat 28:19) in what appears to have become an established formula of the early church.

The Trinity is one of those doctrines that no one could have thought of unless they believed it were true. It is one of the most distinctive parts of Christianity. Far from the abstract, heady piece of theology some make it out to be, it is really central to Christian faith and worship. It means that even before anything was created, God was already love in himself. A little like the discovery of light as a spectrum, the acts of God in the Bible are revealed to have been done not by a unitary individual but by three united Persons, each of whom never acts alone. The eternally loving, self-giving relationship of the members of the Trinity (described as perichoresis, literally "around-dance") is the heavenly prototype of how God intends for us to live towards one another. And in its ultimate mystery (for we can never expect to understand the triune nature of God completely), we are constantly reminded of God's sublime transcendence.

The Incarnation

The other central mystery of the Christian faith is the Incarnation, the fact that the second person of the Trinity became human and lived among us on earth. Jesus, we commonly say, was (and arguably still is) fully God and fully human. How exactly this can be, given the apparent incompatibility of human nature with Jesus' essential attributes as God, was a perennial question that occupied several centuries of early church history; most of the early heresies and theological controversies centered around the status of Christ. The orthodox understanding of the Incarnation was most fully articulated at the ecumenical council of Chalcedon (451), which states in part that Christ is "true God and true human ... of one substance with the Father in his divinity, and of one substance with us in his humanity ... This is one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, manifested in two natures without any confusion, change, divison, or separation. The union does not destroy the differences of the two natures, but on the contrary the properties of each are kept, and both are joined in one person and hypostasis." (Gonzalez 301) More concisely, we may say that whereas the God as Trinity consists of one divine Godhead (or nature) and three Persons, Jesus is one Person with two natures, divine and human.

The biblical evidence for Christ's divinity has already been given, but it's worth reiterating that (contrary to what some skeptics claim) Jesus made more or less explicit claims to being God. The clearest is his assertion that "before Abraham was, I am" (Jhn 8:58), a claim both to coeternity with God and of God's name and self-existence as revealed to Moses in Exo 3:14, which prompted his audience to immediately try to stone him. Likewise he says that he will be enthroned in glory with the angels and judge the nations (Mat 25:31-33), seated at the right hand of Power (Mat 26:64, Mar 14:62). Rather than deny his divinity when accused before Pontius Pilate of making himself to be the son of God, he is silent (Jhn 19:7); likewise, he does not rebuke Thomas when he calls him "My Lord and my God!" (Jhn 20:28). Paul also testifies that Jesus is "the image of the invisible God". But at the same time, Jesus' humanity is evident throughout the gospels: he is born as a baby, grows up normally, he gets hungry and eats, gets thirsty and drinks, gets tired and sleeps, and ultimately dies as a human. John opens his gospel by testifying that "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us" (Jhn 1:14) and Paul likewise says that Jesus "emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men" (Phl 2:7).

The Incarnation is even more fundamental to the Christian faith than the Trinity. For Christ to be capable of saving us, he had to be God, but to redeem every part of humanity, he had to become fully human. (Ware 21) The Incarnation is a powerful and unique rebuke to dualism, monism, and every other way of imagining the relationship between flesh and divinity. God's becoming man demonstrates, in the strongest possible terms, the importance of the physical, which is often neglected in Christian theology and practice. Jesus did not take on flesh to save souls alone, but whole people. His crucifixion and resurrection set the pattern for us all, promising the redemption of the created world as well as the souls within it. As I have previously written, the dual human/divine nature of Christ also serves as a guide for our understanding of the scriptures, which are also fully human and fully divine.

God as creator

Though there is much more that could be said, we turn now from the nature of God to his acts. At the risk of oversimplifying, these break down into two main categories: creation and providence. First, the Bible consistently testifies that God is the creator of all things. This is the intent of the first two chapters of Genesis. Against the backdrop of similar ancient Near Eastern creation accounts like the Enuma Elish or Atrahasis, we see how Genesis contrasts the true God with the gods of Israel's pagan neighbors. No origin is given for God; as mentioned above, he is self-existent, unlike the gods of other creation myths who are often depicted as self-created, arising from primordial chaos. Unlike other creator deities, god creates alone and without a hint of struggle or difficulty, simply with a word. Unlike in Atrahasis, God is strongly distinguished from humans; he created them and is transcendentally higher than they are (barring the Incarnation). He does not create to fulfill any need of his own because he has no needs; from the beginning, his purpose is benevolent, not selfish.

It is also helpful to see what later scriptures make of the creation. Psalm 19 opens with praise to the glory of God as depicted in his handiwork; though God is transcendent from his creation, we can learn something about him by observing it. Job 26:1-14 and Isa 40:12 poetically describe God's acts of creation with a variety of human metaphors: binding up the waters of heaven with clouds, stilling the sea (an ancient symbol of chaos), measuring out the heavens, weighing the mountains. In the New Testament we get some broader statements: John 1:3 strongly asserts that God (with the Word, Jesus) created all things; nothing was made apart from him (see also Eph 3:9; Rev 4:11, 10:6). Though Genesis itself does not depict creation ex nihilo (from nothing), instead adopting the ancient Near Eastern functional understanding of creation as forming an ordered cosmos out of primordial chaos, by the first century this had strengthened to the understanding that "that what is seen was made out of things which do not appear" (Heb 11:3); being the only eternal and self-existent being, God "calls into existence the things that do not exist." (Rom 4:17)

Creation vs. Science?

In the past century or so a good deal of ink has been spilled about how God created the world and everything in it, and the apparent conflict between the biblical and scientific accounts of origins. Two main areas of tension are the age of the earth and the manner in which life (especially humans) came about. In the first case, whereas the Genesis creation account describes the creation as occurring in six days and suggests an age for the earth in the thousands of years, the study of geological strata and radiometric dating indicates that the earth is in fact billions of years old. (Lamoreux 422-427) In the second, the Bible describes the de novo (instantaneous, complete) creation of plants, animals, and humans "according to their kinds" (Gen 1:21,24,25). But the best scientific theory of origins is the theory of evolution, which, based on a fossil record that consistently diversifies and develops over time, postulates that all species evolved over time from a common ancestor via gradual genetic change and natural selection of advantageous adaptations. (Mayr 12-19)

Other evidences for evolution include the identification and tracking of similar features or morphologies between species (for instance, five-fingered mammalian forelimbs) (Mayr 22-27), the fact that embryos of disparate species all pass through very similar stages during development which serve as common foundations from which later structures develop (Mayr 27-30), the existence of vestigial features like teeth in baleen whales or eyes in cave-dwelling animals (Mayr 30-31), the biogeographic distribution of similar and different species which is explained by common ancestors inhabiting distant continents when they were connected (Mayr 31-34), and genetic similarities between species that allow us to estimate the age of their common ancestor with some precision (Mayr 34-39). The theory of evolution explains all of these observations intuitively and consistently. As a side note, it is important to treat evolution as what it is: a scientific theory based on empirical evidence, not a religion or philosophy. Theological or moral arguments cannot alter or disprove it; one fossil found in the wrong geological layer can.

A common way for Christians to respond to these evidences is concordism. This is the belief that the Bible, being the inspired word of God, speaks truth in a way that, being true, will nonetheless be in accord with the knowledge of science or at least not contradict it when both are understood properly. With this in mind, several possible theories are advanced to reconcile the scientific evidence of the age of the earth with Scripture. One of the most popular is the gap theory, which holds that there Genesis 1:1 describes an initial act of creation billions of years ago which suffered a catastrophe and fell into chaos in 1:2; a gap of billions of years takes place before God resumes creating in 1:3. (Erickson 350) The age-day theory holds that the Hebrew word for "day" in Genesis 1, yom, can also refer to an age or epoch, thus allowing the six days of creation to be aligned with different periods in natural history (and explaining how "days" could pass before the sun was created on the fourth day) (Erickson 351). To reconcile the evidence for evolution, the theory of progressive creation is advanced, which holds that God created species ("according to their kinds") instantaneously over a period of time (as they appear in the fossil record), which may have then diversified via the less-controversial process of microevolution. Continuing gaps in the fossil record could indicate points at which God created a new biblical "kind". (Erickson 353-354)

I do not find concordism to be a fruitful way to read Scripture. It tends to produce interpretations that feel forced and ad hoc, not quite doing justice to either the scientific or the biblical evidence and often creating more questions than they answer. For example, the age-day theory must explain how the ordering of God's creative acts in Genesis 1 appears to differ from the order given by science (e.g. the emergence of terrestrial plants before aquatic lifeforms and the sun) and the one given in Genesis 2, as well as cosmological features like the firmament (1:6-8) that have much more corroboration in contemporary ancient Near Eastern literature than in science. The gap theory must explain why God let the earth continue in a state of chaos for billions of years before resuming his creation. Progressive creation must explain why God would create so many species only to let them go extinct in the distant past, apparently before any humans sinned to bring death into the world.

Concordism implies a very literal theory of inspiration (the biblical authors did not fully understand the scientific truth they were writing, even though it bears a striking resemblance to contemporary creation myths) and doesn't seem eager to line up with science; progressive creation accepts microevolution but denies macroevolution when the same basic mechanism is held to be behind both. Additionally, its reliance on gaps in the fossil record is problematic given the tendency of gaps in scientific knowledge to close, not widen. We do much better to hold a view of God that is consistent with what we do know rather than what we don't. Another evidence for the truth of the theory of evolution is that it is predictive, lining up nicely with newly discovered evidence rather than requiring extensive changes to accommodate it. But it seems like concordist theories for reconciling science and Bible are only interested in getting past the current evidence (or even only a subset of that), hence the pointing to gaps.

I believe we best honor the Bible (and its divine author) when we do not expect it to contain modern, scientific truth. Reading it incarnationally, as both divine and human, we realize that the biblical authors communicated God's revelation through them using the literary forms and scientific knowledge of their own culture, not ours. Like Jesus, the Bible is the truth of God in human form. We treat Scripture faithfully when we treat it as it is, a collection of ancient (but nonetheless God-inspired) literature, not inerrant divine oracles free from any influence of their originating culture. When we read Genesis with its human (ancient Near Eastern) context in mind, we see that the idea of divine, de novo creation of man and the cosmos was not revelatory to its ancient Israelite hearers; it was the "common sense" explanation of where we came from, and it predated Genesis by hundreds or thousands of years (Walton 44-49). A modern analogue would be a creation account that glorifies God as the initiator of the Big Bang and author of the laws of physics. Comparative study of Genesis helps us to see how it differs from contemporary accounts, and thus what was revelatory about it, e.g. the fact that God has no origin and created alone, with a word rather than a cosmic struggle, and that he created man for dominion over the creation and relationship with him rather than for servitude.

Theologians have expressed alternatives to concordism even before the scientific revolution gave us any definite reason to doubt the Bible's scientific validity. In his treatise The Literal Meaning of Genesis, St. Augustine writes:
Usually, even a non-Christian knows something about the earth, the heavens, and the other elements of this world, about the motion and orbit of the stars and even their size and relative positions, about the predictable eclipses of the sun and moon, the cycles of the years and the seasons, about the kinds of animals, shrubs, stones, and so forth, and this knowledge he holds to as being certain from reason and experience. 
Now, it is a disgraceful and dangerous thing for an infidel to hear a Christian, presumably giving the meaning of Holy Scripture, talking nonsense on these topics; and we should take all means to prevent such an embarrassing situation, in which people show up vast ignorance in a Christian and laugh it to scorn. The shame is not so much that an ignorant individual is derided, but that people outside the household of faith think our sacred writers held such opinions, and, to the great loss of those for whose salvation we toil, the writers of our Scripture are criticized and rejected as unlearned men. 
If they find a Christian mistaken in a field which they themselves know well and hear him maintaining his foolish opinions about our books, how are they going to believe those books in matters concerning the resurrection of the dead, the hope of eternal life, and the kingdom of heaven, when they think their pages are full of falsehoods and on facts which they themselves have learnt from experience and the light of reason? Reckless and incompetent expounders of Holy Scripture bring untold trouble and sorrow on their wiser brethren when they are caught in one of their mischievous false opinions and are taken to task by those who are not bound by the authority of our sacred books. For then, to defend their utterly foolish and obviously untrue statements, they will try to call upon Holy Scripture for proof and even recite from memory many passages which they think support their position, although they understand neither what they say nor the things about which they make assertion.
In other words: if we interpret the Bible in a way that contradicts things that are common knowledge even to non-Christians, we harm our witness to the gospel and lead people to think that the authors of Scripture and God himself share our ignorance. When we use the Bible to argue against things that nonbelievers know well to be true, we destroy its credibility to them. The book of God's words and the book of God's works should not, ultimately, disagree with each other, and the potential to misunderstand either is close at hand.

It may seem as though Augustine is arguing for concordism after all (saying we should read the scriptures consistently with science rather than contradicting it), but there is a difference between accepting a scientific theory as true and rethinking our reading of Scripture in light of it, and filtering it through our current understanding of Scripture into something altogether different and, to the world, false. The mistaken interpreter in Augustine's example presumably believes his interpretation accurately describes the natural world. We no longer read the Bible like concordists when it comes to the solid firmament holding up the waters of the heavens (Gen 1:6-8, Psa 19:1, Job 37:18), the taxonomy of bats (Lev 11:13-19), or the earth's place in the universe (Jos 10:13; 1 Chr 16:30; Psa 19:6, 83:1; Ecc 1:5; Matt 5:45); we realize that, as ancient people, the biblical authors were simply less knowledgeable than we are on these subjects, and that their ignorance on such subjects in no way inhibits God's ability to speak his word through them.

God as sustainer

In its theology of God as the creator of all that is, Christianity has some parallels with deism. Where they diverge is the matter of God's providence. Christians do not believe that after creating everything visible and invisible and setting up the laws of the universe just so, God stepped back and passively let it all unfold. Rather, he continues to be actively, lovingly involved in his created order. The first way he does this is by sustaining all things. At the most basic level, this can mean simply supporting the continued (contingent) existence of all things; recall that all things "hold together" in Christ. (Col 1:17) Elsewhere we see that Christ is "upholding the universe by his word of power" (Heb 1:3), ruling over not only his image-bearers but stars and planets as the king of all. God's providence is also depicted over the realm of nature, providing for the birds of the air and grass of the field (Mat 26:31); Psalm 104 beautifully (and rather savagely) illustrates God's providence sustaining the whole animal kingdom. Jesus taught that God providentially gives sunlight and rain to the righteous and the unrighteous (Mat 5:45). We also see his sustenance at work in us, particularly in preserving the faith and standing of those who love him, as Paul powerfully argues in Rom 8:28-39.

The Old Testament, especially, reflects an ancient worldview that sees God as the author and actor behind all the workings and phenomena of nature, one that we have tragically lost sight of as science has "explained" nature to us in a way that seems to exclude divine activity. But, as I argued for creation above, the two perspectives are not incompatible. For example, we can view God as the reason that the world is "rational" or regular at all, surprisingly aligned with the workings of our minds, and that we can inductively study it and expect the laws we derive to apply in new situations. "From a purely empirical standpoint, there is no real basis for such an expectation." (Erickson 365) Questions like these, that science leads us to but cannot answer itself, are fertile common ground for integration with a theology of God as sustainer. We can also gain an increased understanding of God's providence in nature through scientific knowledge. In the chaos of the early universe and solar system, as well as in the physical constants that seem "fine-tuned" for the development of life, we get a sense of how incredibly improbable it is that we exist to wonder at it all. A modern scientific view of the world can lead us to wonder at God's creation and providence just as much as an ancient one.

God's providence

God also providentially governs the created order. This governance is hard to cleanly separate from sustenance, but it is more dynamic and specific than constant and general, the working out of a specific and comprehensive design or purpose to a definite end. This is what we mean when we say that God is "sovereign" or that "his kingdom rules over all" (Psa 103:19); he is in control and "accomplishes all things according to the counsel of his will." (Eph 1:11). God's governance extends over nature, where it blurs together with his sustaining work (Psa 135:5-7); over the lives of individuals (1 Sam 2:6-7) and their thoughts and plans (Pro 19:21), over kings and nations (Dan 2:21), the course of human history (Acts 17:26), and even seemingly random occurrences (Pro 16:33). In the New Testament, and especially in Jesus himself, we see examples of a faithful awareness of God's providential plan as a driving force. Paul was set apart to be an apostle before he was born (Gal 1:15), and Jesus was "delivered up [to be crucified] according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God" (Acts 2:23). Jesus himself often viewed his life as consciously fulfilling prophecy (Mat 26:64) and also appealed to God's plan when speaking of future events (Mar 13:7-10, Luk 21:20-22).

Of course this doctrine has some puzzling implications. How does God exercise his sovereignty over our actions, which (it seems to us) are freely chosen? In particular, is God in control over sinful actions and, if so, why does he allow them to happen? Proverbs 16:4 seems to answer "yes" to the latter: "The Lord has made everything for its purpose, even the wicked for the day of trouble." Romans 9:22-24 also seems to affirm God's sovereignty over "vessels of wrath made for destruction". And there is not much room for excluding acts of sin from the all-inclusive verses about God's providence given above. The question begs itself: how can this be? If God detests sin and is in control over all things, why does he allow it? Is he somehow responsible for acts of sin? It seems as though either God's sovereignty over all things or his concern for sin will have to be relativized somehow.

God's sovereignty and human freedom

The two major ways that Protestants attempts to reconcile these poles are Calvinism and Arminianism. Calvinism, named after its the reformer John Calvin, rethinks (though, he would maintain, does not deny) God's goodness in order to uphold his majestic sovereignty over all things. It affirms that nothing happens apart from God's foreordination according to his will; "the will of God is the supreme and primary cause of all things, because nothing happens without his order and permission." (Institutes 1.16.8) In cases where God appears to permit/ordain acts of evil, it responds that we are unable to fully see the full workings of God's providence, so who are we to question his plan? (Institutes 3.24.17, Rom 9:20) Calvinism rests its case on verses like the above-cited ones that affirm the sovereignty of God's plan for all things. In relation to our will, it is compatibilist; the will is never truly free but enslaved in its affections either to sin or to God, so "free" will as we experience it is fully compatible with God's rendering certain human decisions. In answer to the questions "Why do acts of evil happen? Why isn't everyone saved?", Calvinism calmly replies, "because God foreordained everything that happens from eternity past for his glory, according to his good pleasure."

Arminianism, named after its originator James Arminius, conversely seeks to redefine God's sovereignty to uphold his morally perfect goodness. While not denying God's omnipotence, it does not believe that sovereignty means that God is meticulously in control of everything that happens. Rather, he chooses to limit the extent of his sovereignty to allow moral agents like humans to make real choices. This view is held not out of an a priori commitment to a philosophical notion of "free will", but "because they see [free will] everywhere assumed in the Bible, and because it is necessary to protect God's reputation." (Olson 98) An overly meticulous view of God's sovereignty is at odds with all the real moral choices people face in the Bible. And more seriously, Arminians vigorously deny that God in  any way wills or ordains sin, evil, or eternal damnation, for this would make his goodness and justice totally incomprehensible to us.  In relation to the will, Arminians are incompatibilist; they believe free will is incompatible with meticulous divine determination (i.e. an action that is predetermined cannot really be "free"). It views God's sovereignty over free moral agents in terms of influence and response rather than cause and effect, reflecting their personhood and ability to make real choices. (Forlines 12) In response to the questions "Why do acts of evil happen? Why isn't everyone saved?", Arminianism would answer, "Because people are sinful and reject the living God."

Overall, I agree more with the heart of Arminianism's theology and its critiques of Calvinism. If God wills that people sin and reject him, even unto their utter destruction, and this is according to his 'good' pleasure, then it would seem that God is 'good' in a way that is so removed from our understanding of goodness to be meaningless to us. How can we trust that his other attributes, like integrity or love, are not equally confounding? (Fischer 29-36) It carries the awkward implication that, if God ordains all things to his glory, then the consummation of God's glory is somehow dependent on sin and evil. It also creates a puzzling disconnect between God's stated will for man in the scriptures and his sovereign will, especially in passages like Mat 9:27-31 or Luk 5:12-16 where Jesus tells someone to do something but apparently wills for them to do something else. But I also think Arminianism gives more ground than is warranted to philosophical conceptions of "free will", particularly in its stance of incompatibilism. And both systems tend to view conscious decisions as the basic building block of God's sovereignty over humans. I propose that this is the wrong place to start.

I find it more fruitful (and, hopefully, more biblical) to begin with the heart. Calvinism has some conception of this with its view of "free will" as the freedom to do as one pleases (Erickson 328), but it still mostly focuses on the decisions that come from this pleasure. But if we consider the affections, the limits of our "free will" quickly become obvious. I can't consciously control my affections. I can't simply decide to like or hate something and find that my feelings have changed. I don't even know where many of my affections come from or go. I strongly suspect that this is a truth of the human condition; "the heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately corrupt; who can understand it?" (Jer 17:9). Yet I can't deny that my heart has a strong, albeit mysterious, maybe even determinative influence on my "free" choices.  To the extent that I can't influence my heart, God can. Via the heart, we glimpse (but in no way understand) a mechanism by which God's sovereignty and our free will can combine. "The king's heart is a stream of water in the hand of the Lord; he turns it wherever he will." (Pro 21:1) I believe that God can be sovereign over this impenetrable chaos without being responsible for sin.

Similar to Arminius, I would question the notion of "meticulous providence" that is gravely threatened by God not being in full control of anything. Instead, I would identify it more closely with his omnipotence, as the ability to accomplish all that he purposes to do, especially (in the context of the created world) redemption of all things to the perfection envisioned in (among other places) the the end of Isaiah and Revelation, to his ultimate glory. This places the aim of God's will firmly back within the Bible, making it "merely" mysterious rather than incomprehensible. God's plan is bigger than the salvation of individual souls; this is of course something he desires for all (1 Tim 2:4, 2 Pet 3:9) and so he has made provision for it and invites all to salvific knowledge of him through Christ. Yet, in light of the fact that not everyone ultimately comes to love God, we must admit that apparently his sovereignty is not absolute down to this level. As Arminianism holds, this is not because God is unable but because he limits the exercise of his sovereignty to allow people the freedom to embrace or hate him.

When we think about God's sovereignty at this more general level of his plan, we see how sinners can in no way threaten it; they can only exclude themselves from its fulfillment. They do not "break" his sovereignty by pushing away from him, though they may bring sorrow to themselves and others. God does not ordain anyone's sin, but being omniscient he of course knows of it and incorporates it into his providence, working good out of evil (seen most clearly in the crucifixion of Jesus; see also Gen 50:20). Given that God's plan is as eternal and changeless as he is, it is misleading to say that he "responds" to our decisions as if they were somehow new to him.

As a capstone to everything else, I will say that God is mysterious. In many ways that we have seen he is like us (by his design), but at the same time he is transcendent, incomprehensible to us. We must never make the mistake of thinking our descriptions of God can ever fully define him. "Mystery" here does not mean that God is simply absurd to us, but that a full knowledge of God is his alone. The monk and bishop St. Gregory Palamas famously wrote God's true essence is unknowable to us, but we can still know him truly through his energies, the outward, active manifestations of his glory and grace. God's energies (from the Greek energēs, literally "in-working") are not simply tacked-on to his still-hidden essence (Erickson 237); "they are God himself in his action and revelation to the world," (Ware 68) that is, God himself inasmuch as we can ever know him. All of our finite attempts to describe the infinite have to stop somewhere, and so I end my discourse.